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Abstract	  
	  
This research focuses on changes in women’s empowerment and gender parity 
during the reigns of Mohammed VI in Morocco (1999-present) and Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt (1981-11 February 2011).  Despite the absence of regime change in Morocco, the 
social and political reforms taking place under King Mohammed VI are nothing short of 
revolutionary. Likewise, despite the regime change in Egypt, events are proving that the 
celebrated Egyptian revolution was aborted or at best premature. 
 With regard to Morocco, I specifically analyze liberating changes to the concept 
of family in Morocco promoted by King Mohammed VI and his wife’s personas and 
personal choices.  In addition, I look at legal changes in Moroccan family law, human 
rights legislation, and the first of its kind 2004 Equity and Reconciliation (IER) 
Commission.  Finally, I turn to Morocco’s embrace of international human rights 
standards, such as the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) in terms of the Penal, Nationality, Labor, and Electoral Codes.  
Notably, the U.S. has never signed CEDAW, which is known internationally as the 
women’s bill of rights, while Morocco has signed the treaty and more recently removed 
the remaining reservations it had with the treaty.    
Within the Egyptian context, progressive women’s legislation, charted over an 
extended period of time will make up part of my study, with primary focus on legislation 
during Mubarak’s era.   Among the laws addressed are innovations in alimony rights in 
Egypt, predominantly in Law 100 in 1985.  In addition, I look at the changes in Egypt’s 
Personal Status Procedural Law, updated in Law 1 in 2000 and Law 4 2005, which 
advance women’s position in society vis-à-vis men concerning marriage, divorce, and 
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child custody.  Specifically, the paper addresses guardianship of children in the event of a 
divorce, a woman’s ability to seek a divorce (known as the kuhl’ law), and regulations 
governing unregistered marriages (known as urfi marriage).  Finally, Egypt’s progressive 
electoral legislation, in particular the 2009 amendments, which guaranteed a 12% 
women’s quota in parliament, will be scrutinized. 
In addition to analyzing individual pieces of legislation impacting women, I also 
assess human development factors, such as literacy, educational advancement, and 
employment opportunities that affect Moroccan and Egyptian women’s empowerment.  
Other elements that impact women are global changes such as increased urbanization and 
middle class development.  In contrast to family law, which is largely governed by 
Shariah law in these countries, these five elements are notably not linked to Islam and 
vary greatly based on the particular cleavages, leaderships, and political leanings of the 
societies themselves. 
In the conclusion of this study, I will assess the future of these revolutionary 
advances through my analysis of the political and legal agendas and press statements of 
Morocco’s PJD and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP and the Salafi Nour Party.  Any 
marginalization women may have experienced during and immediately after recent 
parliamentary elections will also be analyzed.   Also targeted for analysis are: changes 
made by these parties to their political platforms over time to determine the hardening or 
softening of positions within each party; women’s quantitative success in the recent 
parliamentary elections; and post-election cabinet appointments of women to determine 
any impact of this Islamic occupation of political space on women’s empowerment. In 
the case of Egypt, attention will also be focused on secondary threats to women’s 
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empowerment coming from the transitional military leadership and backlash to 
Mubarak’s reforms. 
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Chapter 1:  The Development of Muslim Feminist Theory:





My thesis project will analyze through a Muslim feminist lens the revolutionary 
changes in women’s empowerment and gender parity in Morocco under Mohammed VI 
and Egypt under Hosni Mubarak.  The Western concepts of democracy and gender 
equality have historical parallels in Islam and it is through this perspective that I will 
examine the agendas of the Islamic political parties dominating recent Moroccan and 
Egyptian parliamentary elections.  Specifically, I will analyze the parties’ social and 
legislative agendas to determine the consequences for local women as these societies 
move toward their own culturally-specific form of democratic political system while 
simultaneously witnessing a rise in political Islam. 
II. Background and Significance: 
The “Arab Spring” 2011 events in the Middle East and North Africa involved an 
array of demonstrations, calls for greater freedoms and government accountability, and 
leadership changes.  Mass movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen overthrew 
long-reigning autocrats in favor of what they termed “democracy.”   Notably, in countries 
such as Morocco and Jordan the mainly secular, Western-leaning monarchies stayed in 
power, promising reforms from within the existing political structures.  Following this 
Arab Spring of political change and electoral openings, Islamic parties won large 
percentages in parliamentary elections. In Tunisia the moderate al-Nahda Party won over 
40%, in Morocco the moderate Justice and Development Party (PJD) won 27%, and in 
Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won 58%, 
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while the ultra-conservative Salafi al-Nour Party won 24%.  This mandate at the polls, 
Western analysts fear, may pose a threat to women’s recent legislative and political 
advances in these countries depending on the agendas pursued by each party.   The 
question of whether a more democratic political system and this subsequent Islamization 
of political space will be a net gain or net loss for the women of these countries is crucial 
to the future of women’s empowerment across predominantly-Muslim states.  Moreover, 
Western concerns that this nascent opportunity for greater democracy might instead 
evolve into a Shari’a-based political system with negative consequences for Muslim 
women are not shared by the majority of Muslim feminists. 
III.  Theoretical Approach 
This project establishes a fresh viewpoint of Muslim feminist thought, using as its 
framework J. Ann Tickner’s discussion of the evolution of feminist theory in Feminist 
Perspectives on Achieving Global Security.  As the Cold War ended and the East-West 
military rivalry lessened, secondary issues such as democratization, human rights, ethnic 
rivalry, and economic globalization took center stage.  These broad issues expanded the 
definition of global politics to allow for the further development of feminist approaches. 
Feminist approaches were not new to international politics.  In the 1970s liberal feminism 
predominated and attempted to remove legal obstacles to resolve women’s subordinate 
position vis-à-vis men.  The radical Marxists and socialists looked to patriarchal 
structures that normalized women’s subordination or to labor market forces that 
discriminated against women.  By the 1980s the focus shifted to a better understanding of 
gender relations and the impact of inequality on women’s lives.  In the 1990s this trend 
shifted again to postcolonial and postmodern feminism, which refocused on local variants 
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of feminism, the avoidance of a single feminism, and the embrace of multiple 
feminisms.1 It is this world of multiple feminisms in which we must identify and develop 
a theory of feminism appropriate for the societies under analysis. 
Women in predominantly-Muslim states, such as Morocco and Egypt, are 
depicted by Western media as submissive, subjugated, voiceless women, relegated to the 
private sphere and veiled, segregated lives.  Conversely, Western feminism is derided by 
Muslim conservatives as anathema to Islamic precepts and concepts of womanhood in 
Muslim states.  A more accurate assessment is the evaluation of recent progressive 
reforms in Muslim societies through a Muslim feminist lens.  The Muslim feminist 
viewpoint provides the religious and cultural sensitivities missing in Western feminist 
theory, while allowing women in predominantly-Muslim states to become the authors and 
subjects of their own narrative. 
Resounding distinctions exist between the viewpoints of a Western secular 
feminist, an Islamic feminist, and a Muslim feminist.  Western secular feminism does not 
take into consideration the needs and expectations of Muslim women.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, Islamic feminists adhere dogmatically to sharia-based Islam.  Islamic 
feminism is even “more radical than [the] more secular Muslim feminisms…[deriving] 
its understanding and mandate from the Qur’an, [which] seeks rights and justice for 
women, and for men.”2  Islamic feminism theoretically focuses on the elevation of both 
men and women, creating a more egalitarian society.    Nevertheless, the interpretation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  J.	  Ann	  Tickner,	  Feminist	  Perspectives	  on	  Achieving	  Global	  Security	  (New	  York:	  	  
Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1992)	  pp.	  275-­‐277.	  
2	  Shadya,	  “Muslim	  Feminism.”	  
www.pbs.org/independentlens/shadya/muslimfeminism.html	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this equality from a Muslim feminist perspective favored the Muslim man to the 
detriment of the Muslim woman. 
Muslim feminists, distinct from either Western or Islamic feminists, base their 
assertions of equality and women’s rights on the Qur’an and Hadith, thereby rejecting 
archaic male elite consensus that underlies both of the other two types.  Muslim feminists 
actively reinterpret and contextualize Islam to make it relevant to their lives today.  They 
use their interpretation of Islam to reinforce a concept of gender equity.  Muslim 
women’s movements are inextricably aligned with nationalist, democratic, and 
humanitarian movements.  Traces of Marxist and socialist theory are also apparent in 
Muslim feminist theory, both of which disregard gender and class in favor of a more 
egalitarian system. 
IV.  Survey of Literature 
The main Muslim feminist authors I will utilize include:  Nana Asma’u, Fatima 
Mernissi, Nawal el-Saadawi, Leila Ahmed, Amina Wadud, and Asma Barlas.  It is 
important in my research to include a wide range of Muslim feminist opinions as I define 
and expand this concept of Muslim feminist theory.  I do not limit my range of Muslim 
feminist writers to a specific geographic area or even to Muslim feminists from 
predominantly-Muslim states.   Nor do I limit my representative sampling of Muslim 
feminist theorists to contemporary writers.   To this end, I have included Asma’u, who 
was Nigerian and lived in the late 19th century, Mernissi, who is a Moroccan, el-Saadawi, 
who is Egyptian, Ahmed who holds U.S. and Egyptian citizenship, Wadud, who is an 
African-American, and Barlas, who is of Pakistani descent. Current observation of 
Muslim feminist theory suffers from a cacophony of voices that could be more clearly 
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understood once organized into an identifiable set of cohesive principles reflecting the 
combined experiences and aspirations of its practitioners. 
From an assessment of these authors’ writings, several Muslim feminists’ 
identifying characteristics are summarized:  First, Muslim feminists assert the 
democratic nature of Islam as a religious system embodied by the equality of all believers 
regardless of sex, race, or social origin. Second, the revolution initiated by Muhammad 
was thwarted by the male elite, who interpreted Islam to maintain and expand their 
interests. Third, the future viability of Muslim nations relies on utilizing the productive 
power of all elements of society, male and female. Relegating women, who constitute 
50% of the population, to the private sphere impoverishes their nations by denying the 
creative and productive potential of their female population. 
 A more in-depth look at each of the Muslim feminist writers 
reveals additional insight from her unique perspective. First, 
nineteenth-century Nigerian Muslim feminist, Nana Asma’u, whose 
collected work has been discussed in One Woman’s Jihad by Beverly 
Mack and Jean Boyd, asserted the absolute necessity of women becoming educated. “It is 
a religious duty to seek knowledge.  Women may leave their homes for this.”3A 
pragmatist, Asma’u promoted women’s education, training women teachers, who then 
travelled throughout the countryside educating women.4   Asma’u linked learning with 
spiritual salvation and a society impeding learning as tantamount to thwarting women’s 
religious salvation.“Any society that impedes equitable access to salvation by controlling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Nana	  Asma’u,	  A	  Warning,	  1856.	  	  (www.chnm.gmu.edu/wwh/p/214.html)	  	  
4	  Beverly	  Mack,	  One	  Woman’s	  Jihad:	  Nana	  Asma’u:	  	  Scholar	  and	  Scribe	  (Indiana:	  
Indiana	  Bloomington	  Press,	  2000).	  	  (www.chnm.gmu.edu/wwh/p/214.html)	  	  
Asma’u	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or limiting who can get an education eschews the tenets of Islam.”5  Asma’u condemns 
the societies that limit learning as committing treachery against the religion of Islam.  
 
Second, Moroccan contemporary feminist, Fatima Mernissi, in 
Beyond the Veil and The Veil and the Male Elite expounds upon the 
principle of the equality of all adherents to Islam regardless of their sex 
and ethnic or social origin.6  According to Mernissi, “Islam does not 
advance the thesis of women’s inherent inferiority.”7  She asserts that access to education 
and paid employment only for men is not supported by Islamic principles.  Instead, 
Mernissi mourns the derailment of Islam’s original egalitarian voice.  “How did the 
tradition succeed in transforming the Muslim woman into that submissive, marginal 
creature who buries herself and only goes out into the world timidly and huddled in her 
veils?  Why does the Muslim man need such a mutilated companion?”8According to 
Mernissi, male politicians have used the sacred to institutionalize their control.9  Male 
supremacy was instituted and maintained by the separation of public and private space in 
contradiction to the way the Prophet Muhammad conducted his own life.   Mernissi 
points to the examples of the Prophet and his wives.  Muhammad’s first wife, Khadija, 
asked Muhammad to marry her, was the first convert to Islam, and his most important 
confidant in the early stages of Islam.  His favorite wife, Aisha, became a political leader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Beverly	  Mack.	  (www.chnm.gmu.edu/wwh/p/214.html)	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and commanded an Islamic army.10  These women reveal the confidence of Muhammad 
and the early Islamic community in women’s capabilities in influential, high-level 
leadership roles.  Nevertheless, the second of Muhammad’s successors to lead the Islamic 
Umma, Omar, could not tolerate an Islam that overturned the traditional pre-Islamic 
relations between women and men and thus the revolution was aborted.11  As this is true 
in politics and the economy, it is especially true with regard to sexual matters.  While 
women’s sexuality was curbed and civilized by Islam; male sexuality was made more 
promiscuous (by virtue of polygamy), urfi marriages (temporary marriages for money), 
and lax (by virtue of repudiation in which men could divorce on a whim).12   The sacred 
was used by men to legitimize certain privileges:  some political and some sexual in 
nature.13 
Mernissi refutes a Hadith from the Prophet that has been used to subjugate 
women and reduce them to second-class status by saying it has been greatly questioned as 
unreliable.  The Hadith states: “A people who entrust power to a woman will never 
prosper.”  Instead, Mernissi promotes a pragmatic approach to women’s incorporation 
into society, postulating that Muslim economic weakness is attributable to the fact that 
only half the nation works since the creative potential and energy is halved.14  In this, 
only half of the creative potential and energy of Muslim society is utilized.  A pragmatist 
herself, Mernissi in a 1994 interview, suggested a practical way Western donor countries 
could promote women’s advancement in Muslim states would be to make “loans to the 
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Arab world from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund…conditioned on 
support of women’s development, since 60-70% of women are illiterate.”15 
Third, Egypt’s Nawal el-Saadawi in The Hidden Face of Eve 
and The Nawal el-Saadawi Reader depicts hypocrisy at many 
levels:  male-female expectations, the West as non-patriarchal, and 
economic development agendas.  She sees the dichotomy between 
male and female expectations.   “Chastity and virginity were considered essential for 
women, whereas freedom and even licentiousness were looked upon as natural where 
men were concerned.”16  El-Saadawi spoke out against female genitalia mutilation 
(FGM) as the patriarchy’s way of forcing monogamy on women, by diminishing their 
sexuality.17  El-Saadawi points out the subtle meaning of the qur’anic verse used to 
justify polygamy as actually forbidding polygamy, when it said:  Marry as many women 
as you wish, two or three or four.  If you fear not to treat them equally, marry only one.  
Indeed you will not be able to be just between your wives even if you try.”18 
El-Saadawi does not limit her chastisement to male-female relations but to East-West 
and class relations as well.   El-Saadawi rejects the West as the model for gender and 
racial relations.  “Should the West be the model?  This implies that the Christian West is 
living under a non-patriarchal, nonsexist, nonracist system.19She speaks out against 
power inequities in colonialism, patriarchy, and class.  She also bemoans globalization 
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and Western structural adjustment programs as economic genocide in which stronger 
countries gain markets while weaker countries gain irrecoverable debt.20  El-Saddawi 
claims that the New Economic World Order is dominated by the U.S. through the United 
Nations, World Bank, IMF, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
dictates the terms of engagement through structural adjustment programs (SAPs).21  El-
Saddawi’s ridicule of Western motives serves two purposes here:  it dispels the notion 
that Muslim feminists are starry-eyed Western groupies and it maintains El-Saddawi’s 
position as a voice for her people against perceived Western exploitation. 
 Fourth, Egyptian-American Leila Ahmed in Women and 
Gender in Islam and Border Crossing uses a contemporary gender study 
lens to analyze Islamic discourse on women in a social and cultural  
context.  She deconstructs traditionalist male-centered patriarchal 
interpretations of Islam rather than Islam itself. According to Ahmed, Muhammad 
advocated the moral and spiritual equality of all human beings and his wives, especially 
Aisha, took an active role in society, making speeches and leading military campaigns.  
Islamic doctrine, however, was developed under the androcentric, misogynistic society of 
the Abbasid caliphate, which quelled the voice of equality and institutionalized the 
patriarchal hierarchy.22 
 
 Fifth, African-American Amina Wadud in Qur’an and Woman 
and Inside the Gender Jihad wrote “the dominant narrative was 
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written by the West of Islam as oppressor and the West as liberator.”23  Wadud 
intends to correct this understanding.  She undertakes Qur’anic exegesis as she 
dissects and critiques interpretations of the Qur’an. According to Wadud, with 
modernity and the globalization of the economy, Muslim nations are analyzing 
Islam’s compatibility with democracy and basic human rights and what it means to be 
human. Wadud encourages bringing women’s voices into the interpretation of sacred 
texts as Muslim feminists deconstruct the gender hegemony in the Qur’an.    For 
example, the “Qur’an uses no terms that imply that the position of ruler is 
inappropriate for a woman.  On the contrary, the Qur’anic story of Bilqis celebrates 
both her political and religious practices.”24The Shariah as well, indicates Wadud, is 
thoroughly patriarchal as women were left out of its institution and must be included 
in a reinterpretation for this oversight to be corrected. 25   In practice as well, Wadud 
believes in breaking unacceptable religious traditions.  In 1994 she defied the male-
only Imam tradition when she herself delivered the first female-led khutba in South 
Africa at the Claremont Main Road Church, thus bringing a woman’s voice into the 
Muslim presence of God.  
Sixth, Pakistani-American Asma Barlas in Believing Women in 
Islam observes that Muslims apply values of inequality into the Qur’an to 
justify existing religious and social structures.  She reexamines the Qur’an 
on key issues to show that its teachings do not support patriarchy. In 
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contradiction to Western stereotypes and Muslim cultural practices, Barlas interprets the 
Qur’an with an eye toward gender equality.  However, Barlas concedes that the issue of 
equality identified in the Qur’an might not translate into equality within society’s legal 
system. While Islam is uncompromising in its assertion of the equality of all believers 
before God, it did not follow that equality before God would mean that men and women 
would be equal before the law.26  Church and state are inseparable in Islam. 
V.  Methodology 
This research focuses on changes in women’s empowerment and gender parity 
during the reigns of Mohammed VI in Morocco (1999-present) and Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt (1981-11 February 2011).  Despite the absence of regime change in Morocco, the 
social and political reforms taking place under King Mohammed VI are nothing short of 
revolutionary. Likewise, despite the regime change in Egypt, events are proving that the 
celebrated Egyptian revolution was aborted or at best premature. 
 With regard to Morocco, I specifically analyze liberating changes to the concept 
of family in Morocco caused by King Mohammed VI and his wife’s personas and 
personal choices.  In addition, I look at legal changes in Moroccan family law, human 
rights legislation, and the first of its kind 2004 Equity and Reconciliation (IER) 
Commission.  Finally, I turn to Morocco’s embrace of international human rights 
standards, such as the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) in terms of the Penal, Nationality, Labor, and Electoral Codes.  
Notably, the U.S. has never signed CEDAW, which is known internationally as the 
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women’s bill of rights, while Morocco has signed the treaty and more recently removed 
the remaining reservations it had with the treaty.    
Within the Egyptian context, progressive women’s legislation, charted over an 
extended period of time will make up part of my study, with primary focus on legislation 
during Mubarak’s era.   Among the laws addressed are innovations in alimony rights in 
Egypt, predominantly in Law 100 in 1985.  In addition, I look at the changes in Egypt’s 
Personal Status Procedural Law, updated in Law 1 in 2000 and Law 4 2005, which 
advance women’s position in society vis-à-vis men concerning marriage, divorce, and 
child custody.  Specifically, the paper addresses guardianship of children in the event of a 
divorce, a woman’s ability to seek a divorce (known as the kuhl’ law), and regulations 
governing unregistered marriages (known as urfi marriage).  Finally, Egypt’s progressive 
electoral legislation, in particular the 2009 amendments, which guaranteed a 12% 
women’s quota in parliament, will be scrutinized. 
In addition to analyzing individual pieces of legislation impacting women, I will 
also assess human development factors, such as literacy, educational advancement, and 
career opportunities that affect Moroccan and Egyptian women’s empowerment.  Other 
elements that impacts women are global factors to include increased urbanization and 
middle class development.  In contrast to family laws, which are largely governed by 
Shariah law in these countries, these five elements are notably not linked to Islam and 
vary greatly based on the particular cleavages, leaderships, and political leanings of the 
societies themselves. 
In the conclusion of this study, I will assess the future of these revolutionary 
advances through my analysis of the political and legal agendas and press statements of 
	   13	  
Morocco’s PJD and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP and the Salafi Nour Party.  Any 
marginalization women may have experienced during and immediately after recent 
parliamentary elections will also be analyzed.   Also targeted for analysis are: changes 
made by these parties to their political platforms over time to determine the hardening or 
softening of positions within each party; women’s quantitative success in the recent 
parliamentary elections; and post-election cabinet appointments of women to determine 
any impact of this Islamic occupation of political space on women’s empowerment. In 
the case of Egypt, attention will also be focused on secondary threats to women’s 
empowerment coming from the transitional military leadership and backlash to 
Mubarak’s reforms. 
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Chapter 2:  Liberal Morocco:  The Woman’s Revolution from Within 
Mohammed VI’s Innovations and Moroccan Women’s Empowerment 
 
I.  Introduction:  Morocco Avoids the Domino Effect 
Morocco experienced a brief period of demonstrations in February 2011 and 
seemed on the brink of a revolution similar to those underway at the time in Tunisia and 
Egypt, but Moroccan King Mohammed VI’s televised speech to the Moroccan people 
seemed sufficient:  they listened, and then went home.   For the time being, change would 
come from within Morocco.  This chapter addresses three main topics:  First, it examines 
the personality, examples, and reforms of King Mohammed and his wife, Salma Bennani, 
which allowed Morocco to withstand the democratic tide sweeping the Arab world in favor 
of an internal monarch-orchestrated “revolution.”   Second, the paper analyzes advances in 
the status of Moroccan women, in terms of human development, economic opportunities, 
and political inclusion.   This section also addresses the impact on Moroccan women’s 
status of global changes, such as increased urbanization and middle class development.   
Finally, this paper analyzes the electoral success of the moderate Islamic Party for Justice 
and Development (PJD) in Morocco’s November parliamentary elections and the 
appointment of PJD head Abdelilah Benkirane as Prime Minister.  The same Islamists who 
opposed western democracy are the ones now benefitting from Moroccan society’s new-
found electoral voice.  The success of the PJD in Morocco’s parliamentary elections is part 
of an electoral mandate across the Arab world in which Islamic parties are making 
significant gains at the polls as these countries embrace their Islamic roots in the face of 
mass complaints of corruption, poor governance, inflation, and unemployment.  The 
question remains how Moroccan women’s hard-won social advances and political 
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representation will be affected by the growth of democracy in Morocco and the rise of 
Islamic parties in politics.   
II.   Mohammed VI:  Progress and Reform 
The popularity of King Mohammed VI’s reign provides him with immunity to the 
so-called “domino effect” that has recently toppled other North African leaders.   To use 
Stephen Covey’s social science metaphor, Mohammed VI has made “deposits” into the 
“emotional bank account” of Moroccans and allayed calls for his ouster by dramatically 
improving the lives of Moroccans through progressive, responsive reforms.  Moroccans 
insisted on reform, but agreed that change should come from within their existing 
monarchical political system, led by King Mohammed VI.   The king’s initiatives 
encompass progressive human rights legislation, reform of Morocco’s Family Law, 
political inclusiveness, and an aggressive approach to improving the national economy.   
Nevertheless, criticisms and concern abound about the king’s reforms, their 
institutionalization, and implementation in society.  
Most importantly to the stability of the Alaouite dynasty, which has ruled Morocco 
since the 17th century as direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, has been its ability 
to reform from within.  Since independence in 1956, Mohammed VI, and to a lesser degree 
his predecessors, Mohammed V and Hassan II, launched reforms and initiatives that 
convinced the Moroccan people that the Moroccan monarchy is the best choice for their 
future.    
Significantly, upon assuming the throne in 1999, Mohammed VI cast himself as a 
progressive leader, supportive of women’s empowerment, beginning with his personal life.  
Whereas his father King Hassan II practiced polygamy and kept two wives in seclusion, 
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Mohammed VI broke with tradition to practice monogamy.  Mohammed VI’s mother was 
only referred to by his father as “the mother of my children,” she was never seen in public, 
and their marriage was arranged.  In contrast, Mohammed VI and his future wife, Salma 
Bennani, met at a party and “it was love at first sight.”  Bennani is from a family of modest 
means but with an excellent education. She and the king dated before their betrothal.    
Mohammed’s choice of Bennani and the way he presented her and her curriculum vitae to 
the country opened up social space within the family, elevating the traditional role of the 
wife in Moroccan society to that of an equal partner.   
 
 
Figure 1 King Mohammed VI and his wife Salma Bennani 
Bennani herself has transformed many stereotypes of the woman’s role in a 
traditional marriage.  She is highly educated in mathematics and computer science.  Before 
her marriage, Bennani worked as an information service engineer at the country’s largest 
holding company, Omnium Nord-Africain Group, and she had the option of continuing to 
work after her marriage.   Upon her marriage, for the first time, a royal Moroccan wife was 
given a title, Princess Lalla Salma, elevating again the wife’s position to the highest rung 
of Moroccan society.  As the wife of the monarch, Princess Salma has assumed a “first 
lady” role.  She appears often in public, travels internationally representing Morocco, and 
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champions her own causes:  AIDs awareness, cancer research, and reducing illiteracy in 
Morocco.   
 Mohammed and Salma’s relationship has expanded traditional Moroccan views on 
marriage, the woman’s role, and husband-wife relations.   They have cultivated a modern 
family image through family videos of them together and with their children that are 
extensively available on YouTube, recalling the visibility of John F. Kennedy’s family in 
the Presidency.  Mohammed VI also depicts himself as a major player in world politics, 
rubbing elbows with world leaders while maintaining a careful balance between his image 
as traditional leader and modernizer.27  
In addition to his modern marriage, Mohammed VI is a highly educated Moroccan, 
having received his PhD in Law in 1993 from the French University of Nice Sophia 
Antipolis with his thesis on “EEC-Maghreb Relations” and an honorary degree from 
George Washington University for his promotion of democracy in Morocco.  Mohammed 
VI seems the perfect western ally.  In his initial television address to the nation, 
Mohammed VI promised to improve Morocco’s human rights record, take on poverty and 
corruption, and create jobs.  He has focused largely on these priorities.   In his first 
interview after assuming his position as king, Mohammed VI indicated that Morocco still 
had much to do in terms of democracy, but that he would only pursue a democracy 
particularly appropriate for Morocco. 
III. Morocco’s Human Rights Legislation and Gender Parity 
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Mohammed VI addressed many of these priorities quickly upon taking the throne.  
With regard to human rights, the King improved his image by distancing himself from 
human rights violations committed under his predecessors.  In 2004 he launched the Equity 
and Reconciliation Commission (IER) to investigate human rights’ violations from 1956-
1999, which included the tenures of his father and grandfather.  This commission was the 
first of its kind in the Arab world.  While the IER offered restitution to the victims of 
human rights’ violations, the commission did not name the perpetrators, presumably out of 
respect for King Mohammed VI.  Mohammed VI’s willingness to acknowledge past 
wrongs committed during his family’s rule marked a new phase in leadership and 
accountability.  Mohammed VI also released many political prisoners, including the head 
of the banned Justice and Charity Movement (JC), Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine, and some 
of the nearly 2,000 Moroccans imprisoned following the 2003 Casablanca bombings.  
Morocco’s engagement with the West is bolstered by the king’s embrace of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which transcend into women’s rights. 
Following the February 2011 demonstrations, in a rare televised address to the 
nation, the King promised still further constitutional reforms.  One change in the 2011 
Constitution directly affecting women is article 19, which guarantees women’s “civic” and 
“social” equality with men, whereas before only their “political” equality was 
institutionalized.  In this vane, the new constitution also created an Authority for Equality 
and Fight against All Forms of Discrimination to bring into practice the recognition of 
these equal rights. 
With regard to gender parity and women’s empowerment, Mohammed VI has 
appeared quite progressive.  While the 1957 Constitution declared women to have the 
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same rights as men, what was practiced in Morocco was Family Law known as 
“Moudawana.”  The Moudawana, which is a personal status code, is based on the Qur’an, 
the hadith, and the Malikite doctrine of jurisprudence and is therefore considered by 
Moroccan Muslims to be enviable.  The Moudawana nevertheless has undergone three 
major reforms since Moroccan independence in 1956.  In the first reform in 1957, 
Mohammed V enacted by royal decree the first Personal Status Code, saying that women 
should be allowed to participate in society.  Women still needed the support of their wali or 
legal guardian to marry and had no rights with regard to divorce or child custody.   Under 
the 1957 Code, women remained perpetual minors with “custody” transferring from father 
or brother to husband.  
Following extensive pressure from the women’s movement, especially the Union 
for Feminine Action (UAF), Hassan II met with the women and then took their concerns 
before the Islamic religious scholars or Ulama for a ruling.  In 1993, again through royal 
decree, major changes were adopted into the Moudawana.  These second reforms were a 
huge step forward for women and opened the door for the first time in centuries to 
substantive change in the prevailing Moudawana.     According to the 1993 revisions, a 
man needed his wife’s permission to take another wife, a wife would get custody of the 
children in the event of her husband’s death, and a religious judge’s approval was 
required for divorce.  Moroccan women celebrated the progress, but still were not 
satisfied with their second-class status. The UAF organized huge demonstrations and 
campaigns to get one million signatures in favor of additional reforms.    During this time, 
the women’s movement faced opposition from within the government from the Ministry 
of Religious Endowment and Islamic Affairs and outside the government from the 
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Association of Moroccan Ulama.28   Moroccan women continued to protest and in 1999 
during Hassan II’s reign the Moroccan government adopted a National Action Plan to 
incorporate women into the economy, protect women from violence, and raise the low 
levels of female education. 
  Most recently, in 2004 under Mohammed VI, a third series of Moudawana 
reforms was passed, notably adopted by the Parliament, and not by royal decree, which 
further ensured the protection of women and children.  The 2004 Moudawana includes 
raising the marrying age of women from fifteen to eighteen to equal that of men, allowing 
women to enter into marriage on their own, requiring men get permission of their first 
wife before marrying again and notifying the second wife of the existence of a first wife, 
granting women the right to divorce, and amending child custody laws to favor the best 
interests of the child.   The 2004 reforms also introduced family courts to ensure that the 
new laws are enforced.29  These reforms greatly increased gender parity in Morocco on 
paper, decreasing women’s marginalization within the family. 
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Constitutional Reform of Moudawana 
Year Monarch Women in 
Society 





1957 Muhammad V 
– royal decree 
Yes No rights No rights No Rights  
1993 Hassan II – 
royal decree 







1999 National Action Plan for Women – incorporate in economy, raise literacy, reduce violence against 
women 
2004 Mohammed VI 
– adopted by 
parliament 
 Women enter into 
marriage on their 
own; Raised legal 



















    
 
Public reaction and qualitative improvements in the lives of women have been 
largely positive.  With regard to the 2004 Moudawana, the number of women who 
contract marriage on their own has increased substantially and women are taking 
advantage of the divorce laws.30  Many women, however, especially among the rural 
elements, are unaware of their rights under the Moudawana, including their right to 
divorce and what constitutes grounds for a divorce.  Judges are also proving capable and 
amenable to applying the many provisions of the Moudawana, especially the laws 
regarding marriage and alimony and laws based on irreconcilable differences.31  Women 
have irrefutably experienced greater gender parity since passage of the 2004 amendments.   
With regard to international laws affecting women, Morocco has also been 
progressive and aggressive in compliance.  In 1993 under Hassan II Morocco signed the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Zoglin,	  Kate,	  “Morocco’s	  Family	  Code:	  	  Improving	  Equality	  for	  Women,”	  Human	  
Rights	  Quarterly,	  Volume	  31,	  Number	  4,	  November	  2009,	  p.	  977.	  
31	  Zoglin,	  pp.	  979-­‐982.	  
	   22	  
but only with reservations to articles 2, 9 (2), 15(4), 16, and 29, which contradicted 
national or Islamic law.    “These reservations deal with the legal and constitutional 
equality between men and women, equality within the family, the right of women to pass 
on their nationality to their foreign-born spouses and children, and women’s right to 
freedom of movement.”32  In December 2008, King Mohammed indicated that 
reservations were no longer necessary in Morocco’s embrace of CEDAW since Morocco 
had “passed an updated national family law in 2004 increasing women’s legal rights.”33   
In fact, the new Family Code used article 16 of CEDAW as a guide granting women 
greater equality and protection for their rights within marriage and divorce, giving 
husbands and wives joint responsibility for their families.  
  Changes to the Moudawana were not the only gendered reforms under 
Mohammed VI, the 2003 Penal Code and 2004 Labor Code also have relevant clauses 
affecting women.   The 2003 Penal Code criminalized sexual tourism, sexual abuse, 
trafficking in persons and child pornography.  Criminalizing domestic abuse was another 
major step forward in penal code reform, which until these amendments looked upon 
domestic violence as a family affair in which law enforcement would not interfere.  In 
2007, the Ministry of Social Development, Families, and Solidarity published the first 
official data on violence against women in Morocco.  A total of 17,511 cases of violence 
were reported from 2006 to 2007, with 23 percent of these cases identified as physical 
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violence.34  Marital rape is still not considered a crime and criminal charges against 
rapists are dropped if the rapist agrees to marry his victim as illustrated in the recent 
Amina Felali tragedy.  In addition, the Moroccan Labor Code was revised in 2004 to 
counter sexual harassment in the workplace.   This law also increased the minimum 
employment age from twelve to fifteen to combat child labor.  Many underage girls work 
as domestic servants and in textiles in Morocco.    
One last piece of legislation improving gender parity in Morocco was 
amendments to the Nationality Code in 2007, which gave women equal rights to transmit 
nationality to their children.35   Prior to this, the 1958 Nationality Code allowed only 
fathers to pass on their citizenship to Moroccan children, now women married to 
foreigners can pass on their Moroccan citizenship.   Without this law, children living in 
Morocco with a Moroccan mother and foreign father were foreigners in their own 
country, having to apply for residence permits annually and denied state-funded 
university grants and the right to vote.36   
IV. Challenges to Progressive Legislation Enactment 
 With all the mixed signals of social and legal progress coupled with popularly 
approved constitutional reforms, it is difficult to determine if Morocco is taking steps 
towards democracy or sidesteps in order to maintain monarchical control.   Extremely 
important is the degree to which Mohammed VI can activate the changes he has fostered 
in human rights, family law, and parliamentary liberalization.  These reforms have 
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certainly opened up social and political space within which universal human’s rights, 
greater government accountability, and improved gender parity can progress.   One 
challenge in institutionalizing these new laws is the high illiteracy rate in Morocco, which 
makes promulgation and activation of new laws problematic.  In addition, certain 
freedoms, such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press, are granted as long as the 
king and his policies are not criticized.   
V.  The Status of Moroccan Women:  Human Development 
In addition to human rights legislation, King Mohammed is pursuing development 
projects at home, engaging in international markets, and pursuing foreign investment in 
Morocco’s economy.   In 2005 the King launched a National Initiative for Human 
Development (INDH), funded in part by loans from the World Bank, which included a $2 
billion program to alleviate poverty, expand electricity to rural areas, and replace urban 
slums with public and subsidized housing.37   While focusing on these proactive measures 
at home, King Mohammed is simultaneously engaging the West by entering into a Free 
Trade Agreement with the U.S. in 2006 and entering advanced status of the 2000 
Association Agreement with the EU in 2008.  Finally, in June 2010 Morocco launched a 
media campaign to court foreign investors, particularly France and Spain.  Much of the 
progress of Moroccan women since the 1956 independence has been through human 
development efforts of women’s NGOs, National Action Plans, and other initiatives, such 
as the INDH.   
Two main indicators of human development are literacy rates and educational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Martin,	  Ivan,	  “Morocco:	  	  The	  Bases	  for	  a	  New	  Development	  Model?	  (I):	  	  The	  
National	  Initiative	  for	  Human	  Development	  (INDH),”	  Real	  Instituto	  Elcan,	  April	  5,	  
2006,	  pp.	  1-­‐6.	  	  
	   25	  
opportunities.  Illiteracy is a major problem in Morocco for both men and women.  
Morocco’s literacy rates are well below those of other North African states, such as 
Tunisia and Egypt for both genders (see Figure 2).  
Literacy Rates in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt 
 Literacy 
over age 15 
total 




Morocco 56% 69% 44% 77% 85% 68% 
Tunisia 78% 86% 71% 97% 98% 96% 
Egypt 66% 75% 58% 85% 88% 82% 
Figure 2 Statistics based on CIA 2011 World Factbook (But census data collected in 2004) 
According to Muslim feminists, the first message Allah sent to Muhammad was the first 
verse of sura 96 “Iqra” (Read).  Illiteracy is especially rampant in rural areas of Morocco.  
With forty percent of Morocco’s workforce on farms, illiteracy remains a huge obstacle 
to the development of society.38  While illiteracy rates among Moroccans over ten years 
of age have dropped from 43% in 2004 to 38.5% at the end of 2006, rural areas remain at 
55% illiterate.39   There is a discrepancy, however, between the genders with a higher 
percentage of illiteracy over age 15 and 25% more men than women literate in this age 
range.  In 2004 three quarters of all women in Morocco were illiterate.40 Morocco has 
made eradicating illiteracy a national mandate, seeking to “teach one million people per 
year to read and write, to bring the illiteracy rate below 20% by 2010 and to completely 
eradicate it by 2015.”41    Nevertheless, as of 2011 it was estimated that 55% of all 
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Moroccan women and 90% of all rural women were still illiterate.42  As the 2011 CIA 
World Factbook Literacy ratios were based on a census taken in 2004, it is impossible to 
corroborate if the 20% improvement for 2010 was accomplished.   Due to the literacy 
campaign, illiteracy statistics among the younger generation are improving for both 
genders.   Women, however, are still 17% more illiterate than men revealing a gender 
bias in education favoring men over women.   Illiteracy has wide-ranging consequences 
for the development of society and a democratic representative government.  As Nadia 
Yassine, the daughter of the Islamic Justice and Charity (JC)’s founder, highlights “the 
conditions for political and democratic participation in Morocco are not present.  How are 
people to vote and choose their leaders when an important segment of the population is 
illiterate?”43  Comparatively, in Tunisia and Egypt, literacy rates of the younger 
generation, especially among women, show that it is a higher priority and with greater 
success.  The question that remains is to what degree the Moroccan government has taken 
practical steps to ensure that the literacy goals are realized by 2015. 
In Tunisia and Morocco, increases in literacy run parallel to increases in 
secondary and tertiary education (see Figure 3).  Morocco as well has shown a similar 
push towards instituting universal education.  In 1963 Morocco made education 
compulsory for children ages 8-13.   While Tunisia and Morocco have both experienced 
increases in educational levels, Tunisia has almost twice the levels of secondary attendees 
and three times the number of tertiary students as Morocco.  
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Secondary School Attendance:  Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt 
 2006 2007 2008 
Morocco 52 56 No Data 
Tunisia 87 90 92 
Egypt No Data No Data No Data 
 
Tertiary School Attendance:  Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Morocco 12 11 12 13 
Tunisia 32 34 No data No data 
Egypt 29 29 28 No data 
Figure 3 Percentage of Secondary and Tertiary Education Attendees Based on World Bank Statistics 
The educational level of a society generally affects its stability and democratic leanings 
as “schooling trains people to interact with others and raises the benefits of social 
participation, including voting and organizing.”44  As a populace becomes more educated, 
they are capable of organizing, forging alliances, and demanding a more active role in the 
mechanisms governing their society and personal wellbeing.  Moreover, women’s 
prospects improve as their level of education increases.  “Illiterate women have an 
average of 4.7 children, while women with secondary education have an average of 3.7, 
and university educated women have 2.3 children on average.”45   
 One aspect of illiteracy and education rates not frequently addressed in Moroccan 
or international media is the large population of Berbers, some estimates as high as 50%, 
of the Moroccan population.  As all educational materials are in Arabic and some 
Moroccans speak only Berber this is a source of contention.  The 2011 changes to the 
Moroccan constitution making Berber, along with Arabic, the national language, have the 
ability to rectify this oversight, but will require additional investment in terms of reading 
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materials and academic programing. 
 Another factor, employment opportunity, must also be considered when 
comparing Morocco’s development of women vis-à-vis Tunisia and Egypt.  In this area, 
Morocco shows some of the greatest potential.  More women work outside the home in 
Morocco than in any other Arab country, excluding Lebanon.   Moreover, while Tunisia 
has the highest unemployment rate of the three countries at 14%, Egypt and Morocco 
have a much lower unemployment rate, 9.4% and 9.8% unemployment respectively.  
More women are working in Morocco than in Egypt and more Egyptian men are out of 
work than Moroccan men, with Egypt only having a slightly lower unemployment rate 
across genders than Morocco.  It is notable that while Tunisia has the smallest percentage 
of any population in the lower class, it has the highest unemployment statistic.  This 
means that Tunisians are more literate, highly educated, but with fewer prospects; 
whereas an exceedingly high percentage of Moroccans, especially the rural elements, are 
illiterate with only the upper classes highly educated.  Notably, it was a young 
purportedly college-educated Tunisian, Mohamed Bouazizi, forced to sell fruits and 
vegetables because he could not find a job, who set himself on fire, thus sparking the 
Tunisian revolution.   
 Challenges with unemployment and economic instability necessitating two bread-
winner families have strengthened women’s argument to enter the labor force.  Some 
Moroccan employers prefer to hire women over men, but not from an equality of 
opportunity standpoint, instead, employers choose to hire women over men because 
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women are willing to accept a lower wage and fewer benefits.46  The decision to pay 
women less and compensate them less is due in part to the perception that while men are 
obligated to support their families, women are not obligated in traditional Muslim society 
to be providers.  Women in Rabat commented, “women only want to get money for 
makeup.”47  While not true, of course, for most women, this stereotype perpetuates 
uneven compensation for the work of women.  Consequently, women are not viewed as 
the “head of household” in Morocco, justifying the continued gendered salary 
discrepancy. 
 While generally seen as a positive good, employment opportunity can also have 
negative repercussions as illustrated by the “extremely high child labor rates, with tens of 
thousands of girls under fifteen working as child maids, working in the textile industry, or 
apprenticing in traditional arts and crafts.”48   Child labor also impacts literacy rates as it 
affects the girls’ ability to finish their education.  Likewise, a lack of education forces 
some women into subordinate positions as maids and service industry employees, poorly-
paid labor.  Whereas employment provides Moroccan women with financial freedom and 
options, women who work still return home to unpaid work as housewives.  While 
working women may enjoy more respect from their husbands and extended family, 
nevertheless, concern exists about who is raising the children in Moroccan society if the 
wife is employed.  
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A final consideration regarding labor conditions in Morocco is the high level of 
Moroccans working abroad.  Among African countries, Morocco has the highest number 
of its citizens living and working in European countries, primarily France and Spain, 
which by some estimates reaches 10% of the total Moroccan population.  This export of 
Moroccan workers improves the lives of Moroccans who send back remittances to 
families still living in Morocco and increases employment opportunities for those 
remaining in Morocco.  However, there are questions about the negative impact of 
remittances on local development.  Historically the majority of these migrants were 
married men going abroad to work and sending remittances back to families residing in 
Morocco, but today many of these migrants are single men and women going abroad to 
study, who are staying abroad to work.  In addition, women are going abroad with their 
families or alone and taking jobs as domestics, nannies, and cleaners, jobs that men 
generally do not take.  Regardless, remittances play a vital role in Morocco’s economy, 
topping that of foreign tourism in terms of foreign investment in the Moroccan 
economy.49   
VI. Global Forces:  Urbanization and Middle Class Development 
Along with human development, economic options also unleash global forces, 
such as increased urbanization and a rising middle class.   Morocco, along with Egypt 
and Tunisia, has experienced population growth and rapid urbanization (See Figure 4).   
With the best land appropriated for cash-crop export sales, peasant families are flocking 
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to the urban centers in search of work.50   
 
Population and Urbanization Statistics 
 Morocco Egypt Tunisia 
1950s Population 13 million 42.3 million NA 
Population Today 32 million 82 million 11 million 
Urbanization % 58% 43% 67% 
Figure 4 Urbanization Statistics on Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia based on CIA World Fact Book Statistics 
Higher rates of literacy and education are characteristic of urban centers compared to 
their rural counterparts and an urban-rural divide is clearly prevalent in Morocco.   Urban 
centers are where the educated gather, share ideas, and increase their economic prospects.    
Urbanization in Morocco has introduced major changes in traditions, patterns of 
consumption, attitudes, institutional arrangements, knowledge base, and political 
awareness.51 
In addition, urbanization in Morocco has greatly affected the status of Moroccan 
women. Women in urban areas tend to marry later in life and have more educational and 
career options than rural women.   Urbanization contributes extensively to sexual 
desegregation of public space, increased importance on the nuclear families, and 
increases in offspring choosing their own marriage partner.  In urban settings the 
marrying age rises, whereas in rural settings girls marry younger and to older men.  In 
urban settings the marrying age is closer between men and women as women wait longer 
to get married and urban more educated men are financially able to marry younger.  
Urbanization and the nuclear family have repercussions for the children as well since in 
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rural extended families, grandmothers, aunts, and older children help look after younger 
children. The increased interaction between men and women in urban settings also leads 
to greater equality between the genders.  Moroccan feminist, Fatima Mernissi, would 
suggest that this desegregation introduces love into urban marriages whereas rural 
marriages are more likely to be arranged and occur earlier than their urban counterparts.52 
 
A strong middle class is able to hold the government accountable for improved 
living conditions through unions, civic organizations, and mass demonstrations more 
efficiently because the middle class is the backbone of the state’s economic viability.  A 
study conducted by Morocco’s High Commissioner for Planning (HCP) in 2007 asserted 
that 53% of the Moroccan population is middle class, 34% lower middle class and 13% 
upper class. In this study, the Moroccan middle class expressed a number of social 
concerns, which included the high cost of living, drought, school drop-out, 
unemployment, disease, and a lack of security. 53   Tunisia’s middle class, on the other 
hand, is larger, more highly educated and better off economically than that of either 
Morocco or Egypt (See Figure 5), and they were the first in North Africa to rise up 
against autocratic rule.  
Middle Class Development:  Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt 
 Morocco Egypt Tunisia 
Lower 34% 40% 13.8% 
Middle 53% 40-50% 80% 
Upper 13% Less than 10% 6.2% 
Figure 5 Middle Class Development 
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A larger middle class provides the critical mass of education, economic means, 
organizational opportunity, and collective political presence to demand government 
responsiveness and Tunisia had just these elements in place in 2011.  Having a larger 
portion of the population middle class instead of upper class prevents them from having 
as much of a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and existing privileges.  
Moreover, it is harder to coopt the economically-free-agents middle class than the lower 
classes that are dependent on government subsidies and the upper classes that are the 
recipients of government perks and favors. 
VII. Women’s Political Representation 
Finally, women are gaining access to political power through changes in electoral 
codes and political quotas.  A new gender inclusiveness is apparent in Morocco’s 
parliamentary elections and until 2011, recent cabinet appointments.   In 1993, only two 
women were elected to the Chamber of Representatives or lower house, but in 2003 
Morocco introduced a proportional list system and increased the number of women 
elected to thirty-five.  Of those, thirty members were elected nationally to seats reserved 
for women and five were elected via local elections.  With this election Morocco went 
from 1% of female representation in parliament to 11%, ranking second only to Tunisia 
in terms of female representation in politics among Arab states.54    The 2007 
parliamentary elections in Morocco were seen as a step back for women with only 34 
females elected to parliament.  To compensate, Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi appointed 
seven female ministers, ranging from energy to culture, compared with only two 
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ministers in the previous government.  These appointments were seen as a way of 
placating the women’s movement in Morocco after the less than satisfactory 
parliamentary representation.   In the most recent parliamentary elections held in 
November 2011, sixty reserved seats were earmarked for women from the national lists, 
plus seven more women were elected in local elections, and thus the number of women in 
parliament rose to 67 or 17%, equaling the 17% women in the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 2011.  In recent cabinet appointments, however, only one woman was 
named to the cabinet, which has received extensive complaints and will be dealt with 
further in chapter 4.  
 Number of 









1993 2 women 1%   




2003 35 women 11% 2 Cabinet 
Members 
 
2007 34 women 11% 7 Cabinet 
Members 
 
2011 67 17% 1 Cabinet 
Member 
PJD 
Figure 6 Moroccan Women's Political Representation 1993-2012 
 
VI.  Conclusion:  Mohammed VI’s Legacy and Executive Power 
Concerns 
Based on the comparison of Morocco to Tunisia and Egypt, two countries that did 
choose to overthrow their current governments, early reforms made by King Mohammed 
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may have filled the Emotional Bank Account of Moroccans and contributed to 
Mohammed VI’s longevity in power, especially with regard to his progressive women’s 
legislation.  In addition, many of the traditional pre-cursors to a transition to democracy 
are simply not as evident in Moroccan society as in Tunisia and Egypt, especially a 
strong middle class, high literacy rates, and broader levels of education.  To extend the 
advancement of women into all spheres of society, actors from NGOs, the government, 
and aid donors, must engage the women, the Muslim feminists, whom they are trying to 
promote in order to determine the most beneficial path to follow to meet the needs of 
local communities and individuals. 
Despite his progressive gendered reforms, some concerns remain with regards to 
the institutionalization of Mohammed VI’s reforms and potential setbacks to the 
egalitarian path he promotes.  A main rival and alternate pathway may come from the 
Islamic PJD and an Islamic retrenchment when faced with the current progressive reform 
agenda.  Gains must be institutionalized and widely promoted and accepted in society for 
their consolidation and longevity to be assured. 
  The king’s choice of electoral systems calls into question his desire to foster a strong 
counter-voice in Moroccan society or if elections and a government are just scapegoats 
for any malcontents, while the king remains above reproach.  In 2002 the Interior 
Ministry on behalf of the king restructured the electoral laws from a pure single-member-
district system into a PR system with two lists and the remainder system, which makes it 
unlikely for any party to win more than one seat per district.55  This manipulation of the 
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electoral process to achieve certain political ends dilutes parliamentary power to the 
benefit of the monarchy.  The Moroccan electoral process remains embedded in power 
structures that tend to reproduce, rather than challenge, the status quo.56 Moreover, the 
king can dissolve the parliament, legislate between sessions, declare a state of emergency, 
and revise the Constitution through a national referendum, which reveals the extensive 
powers resting with the executive branch to the detriment of the legislative. 57 
Even constitutionally, the king maintains complete power.  According to Articles 
23 and 28 of the constitution, it is a crime to criticize the king’s policies and decisions.  
Thus, opposition voices within the legislature are silenced.  Article 39 curbs members of 
parliament, who can lose their parliamentary immunity for expressing opinions that may 
be considered disrespectful to the king.  Better to remain silent than to risk inadvertent 
offenses with professional and perhaps legal ramifications.   It is difficult to see how a 
true opposition can develop when there is no political space in which to critique, 
challenge, or even question the king.  If the king has the power to dissolve parliament and 
disband the government, he still retains ultimate control.   
 The opening of political space through elections may, however, allow for the 
development of true democracy, including competitive elections, meaningful opposition 
parties, and freedom of expression.  Now that the people have elected their first prime 
minister indirectly by electing his party, the real test is the power King Mohammed 
allows him to wield.   The absence of substantial checks and balances within the 
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executive, judicial, and legislative branches creates opportunities for individual excess of 
power.  The recent referendum-approved constitutional reforms also granted the prime 
minister more control over his cabinet and the people more electoral control in that the 
prime minister will be chosen from the majority party in parliament.  While this 
distinction gives the appearance of the king loosening control, Mohammed VI still retains 
significant power.   The king still controls the military and perhaps more importantly the 
powerful local governors are still appointed by the king.  Much of the power in Morocco 
resides in these local political figures. 
By all accounts, the 2007, 2009, and 2011 elections in Morocco were “among the 
most free and fair elections globally in years.”58     The overriding power in the country, 
however, rests in the monarchy, which is not accountable to the people and above the law.   
The king names the key ministry positions, including Justice, Defense, Foreign Affairs, 
Religious Affairs, and the Interior Ministry.   Under King Hassan, a 1996 constitutional 
amendment provided for the direct election of the entire Chamber of Representatives 
(lower house) while giving representatives in the Chamber of Councilors (upper house) 
unparalleled power to check the lower house.59  Notably, public associations and 
municipal bodies loyal to the king, elect the upper house, not public voting.  In addition, 
eighteen provincial governors, appointed by the king, wield the majority of the provincial 
power, while the mayors and local councils, with substantially less power, are elected by 
the Moroccan people.  The king also appoints judges, so the prospects of an independent 
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judiciary are not realized. 60 
  King Mohammed VI continues largely to reign as an “enlightened despot” similar to 
his father, but with a gentler and more inclusive approach.  While many of his policies 
and reforms are very popular among Moroccans, there are also clear signs that everyone 
is not satisfied in Morocco and people are disillusioned with the façade of Moroccan 
electoral politics.  In the 2007 elections, perhaps, the voices of the Moroccan people were 
heard most strongly when they chose not to exercise their right to vote.  Only 37% of 
registered voters cast ballots and about one-fifth of the cast ballots were spoiled .61  The 
official participation rate of registered voters in 2007 was down from 51.67% in 2002, 
and 58% in 1997 elections to Morocco’s lower house.62  If Moroccans are not allowed to 
verbalize their attitudes towards their monarchy or perhaps their government in public, 
they will express their opposition at the polls. 
King Mohammed’s title as Commander of the Believers and a descendant of the 
Prophet, places him above reproach, especially from would-be opposition elements 
among the Islamic parties.  Islamists, however, inside and outside the government have 
opposed the progressive stance towards women as anathema to Islam and a Western 
concept.  Morocco’s signing of CEDAW in 1993 and the National Action Plan in 1999 
were both opposed by Islamists who see Western democracy and Western feminism as 
incongruent with Islam.  When the Salafiya Jihad carried out the May 16, 2003 
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Casablanca bombings, their actions acted as a catalyst for women to demand further 
institutionalization of their rights.   
With the Islamic Party of Justice and Development (PJD) winning the most seats 
in parliament and thus its leader, Benkirane, became the new Moroccan Prime Minister, 
two questions remain:  First, can the PJD deliver where secular parties failed and avoid 
charges of corruption and complacency?  Second, have events such as September 11 and 
the Casablanca Bombings reversed the extremist trend of some Salafi movements in 
Morocco and moderated their political and social agenda?  The arrival of the PJD to 
preeminence in Moroccan politics and the potential impact of political Islam in Morocco 
will be addressed further in Chapter 4.     
It is clear that some measures taken by King Mohammed have served to 
consolidate and protect monarchical authority rather than to promote increased 
democratization.  King Mohammed balances a thin line between the West’s shining 
example of an Arab progressive and the autocratic religious leader of the Alaouite 
dynasty, placating progressives within the country while simultaneously mollifying 
Islamic elements. 
Mohammed VI’s innovative policies and gendered reforms seem to have 
appeased the Moroccan people, who see him as a reformer and the best choice for 
Morocco’s future.   Furthermore, Morocco seems developmentally premature for a 
transition to democracy similar to that in Egypt and Tunisia.  Some Moroccans would like 
to see a parliamentary monarchy more along the lines of Great Britain and Spain, with the 
monarchy playing a largely ceremonial role while the real power rests in the parliament 
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and prime minister, others feel the government, not the monarchy, is corrupt and they stand 
by their king as knowing what is in the best interests of Morocco.   
In conclusion, Mohammed VI’s reforms, initiatives, and personal image have 
assuaged critiques in favor of the continuation of the Moroccan modernizer, 
democratizing Morocco in a particularly “Moroccan way,” while maintaining the 
majority of national power in his own unelected hands.  Morocco seems on the right path 
towards greater pluralism, however, due to the efforts of Mohammed VI, civil society, 
NGOs, and foreign donors.  The problem will be that his reforms and initiatives are not 
institutionalized, that democracy will not be consolidated, that public institutions will 
only represent fleeting images of national consensus, and a less progressive autocrat will 
follow Mohammed VI. 
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Chapter 3:  Progressive Egypt: The Women’s Revolution  
Women’s Empowerment and Gender Parity under Mubarak and Beyond 
 
I. Introduction:  Muslim Feminist Perspective 
Muslim feminists see God’s word in the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad’s 
example (sunna, and hadith) as supportive of the elevation of women’s status and voice 
in Muslim society.  Nevertheless, the predominant conservative interpretation of Islam 
has meant an entrenchment of Islam in seventh-century patriarchal norms.  Progressive 
legislation increasing women’s empowerment and greater gender parity in Egyptian 
society challenged these social norms prior to and during the Mubarak era. This paper 
analyzes the major trends in Egyptian women’s empowerment leading up to the Mubarak 
era, then focuses on substantive pieces of legislation passed during Mubarak’s thirty-year 
leadership to show the extensive gains made by women.   Major legislative reforms have:  
raised women’s legal marrying age; equalized rights of divorce, inheritance, and child 
custody; created additional legal institutions to oversee the new laws; and allocated 
financial resources to enable their enforcement.   
II. Egypt’s Ideological Underpinnings and Women’s Advancement 
Nineteenth-century Egyptian leader Muhammad Ali equated societal progress with 
the education of women.  Thus, Egypt began to define a framework for not only women’s 
advancement, but the advancement of Egyptian society.  Under Ali, upper- and middle-
class women were granted the opportunity to an education, which later expanded to all 
socio-economic levels of society.  In 1832 the state built a school to train women doctors, 
but no further advances until the 1870s.63  In the 1870s Egypt launched a major 
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educational reform initiative that created a bifurcated educational system, pitting modern 
secular education against traditional Islamic education. 
In the twentieth century, Egypt experienced three distinct phases of governance, each 
influencing the role of women in Egyptian society.  First, was a period of democratic 
governance under the Wafd party; second, a period of Soviet leanings and socialist 
development under Nasser; and third, under Sadat and Mubarak, a period of Western-
leaning Egyptian nationalism.  Each of these distinct phases left its mark on the pathway 
of women’s advancement and development in Egyptian society. 
  In 1918, the Wafd party came to power in Egypt, issuing in three decades of 
democratic governance. The Wafd party, filled with modernizing intellectuals 
promulgated a platform of democracy, which included a constitution guaranteeing the 
rights of the individual, pluralism, and secularism committed to the equal rights of all 
Egyptians.   Once in power, the Wafd promoted education as the key to progress.  To this 
end, the Wafd opened free schools for girls and boys.  In addition, the Wafd opened a 
modern university named after King Fuad, which admitted women almost from its 
inception.  The Wafd’s political goals and platform carried villages as well as major cities, 
showing its appeal across a wide spectrum of rural and urban elements.64   The Wafd 
institutionalized its political ideals in the 1923 Constitution, which granted equal rights to 
all Egyptians without distinction of race, language, or religion.  By the mid-twentieth 
century, Egypt was a European-style country politically, committed to:  freedom of 
speech; free public education; the modernization of the role of women; ending the 
practice of veiling; and government by democracy. 
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  This period of democratic experimentation was cut short in 1952 when a group of 
young army officers ousted King Farouk, abolished the constitutional monarchy, and 
ended British occupation of the country.  Under the leadership of President Nasser, a new 
phase of Egyptian history began, characterized by the rise of Arab nationalism and 
Egypt’s turn towards the Soviet Union and socialism.  During this period, Nasser 
eliminated the growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communists, and 
remaining Wafd loyalists by banning all opposition political parties, followed by 
crackdowns and arrests of opposition elements.   In 1956, Egypt drafted a new 
constitution, which created a one-party system and eliminated the pluralism that had been 
prevalent during the Wafd period.   The military’s consolidation of power and privilege 
in Egypt foreshadowed the current power play occurring today in which the military and 
the Muslim Brotherhood are once again vying for power, privilege, and the loyalties of 
the Egyptian people.   Under Nasser and Arab Socialism, the status of women improved 
dramatically in Egypt.  Egypt embraced free public education for both secondary and 
tertiary levels and encouraged professional mobility, regardless of class.65   While 
Egyptian women enjoyed a time of advancement with ideological and political support, 
democracy and pluralism suffered under Arab Socialism. 
 Following the disastrous 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian Presidents Sadat (1970-
1981) and Mubarak (1981-2011) moved Egypt firmly into the Western camp, but their 
leadership was seen as increasingly corrupt and illegitimate.  Sadat re-instituted the 
multi-party political system, stifled by Nasser.  He also liberalized the Egyptian economy, 
reducing subsidies and retracting the excessive state bureaucratic system, leading to 
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widespread unemployment.  Politically, Sadat accommodated the Islamists, freeing 
political prisoners and engaging in political dialogue, but his unpopular 1973 peace treaty 
with Israel fueled resentment among Islamic elements, leading to his 1981 assassination.   
  Mubarak maintained his hold on power with strong ties to the U.S. complete with a 
large annual financial aid packet, estimated at 2.1 billion dollars.   Mubarak used Sadat’s 
assassination to impose emergency law, which gave the state extensive powers to 
unwarranted arrests and curbs on basic freedoms.  Mubarak also used Sadat’s 
assassination as justification to crack down on Islamic elements, among them the MB.  
Under Mubarak, Egypt enjoyed a period of stability and relative economic prosperity, but 
the opposition voices grew as Mubarak allowed some democratic political liberalization 
to give rise to simmering grievances.  
III.  Egypt’s Human Rights Legislation and Gender Parity  
 
This section focuses on the advances of Egyptian women during the Mubarak era. 
The key indicators of progress addressed are:  first, progressive human rights legislation 
and personal status reforms; second, human development factors in terms of increased 
literacy, educational advancement, and professional opportunities; third, major global 
changes, such as urbanization and middle class development, and finally, women’s 
political representation. 
Many argue that the concept of universal human rights is just another attempt at   
Western cultural hegemony.  The United Nations Human Rights Charter is based on 
democratic assumptions, namely the sovereignty of the individual, over the community.66     
This concept of the community over the individual rings of Socialist principles, but is 
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also prevalent in Islamic ideology. Muslim feminists argue the need for an indigenous 
Muslim theoretical and practical reconstruction in the human rights discourse more 
appropriate to Islamic theoretical origins.67  They would frame these human rights 
contributions in Muslim feminist teachings of which Barlas is one voice advocating an 
Islamic solution through reinterpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna in keeping with today’s 
realities.   Perhaps human rights requires societal contextualization.   Feminism in the 
singular is sociologically inappropriate, perhaps human rights must also be culturally 
specific.68   Even Muslim feminism is a cacophony of voices, each interpreting and 
tailoring Islam to fit her particular culture and circumstances.  
 While viewing Muslim societies through a Western lens is replete with pitfalls 
and shortcomings, nevertheless, the establishment of internationally-accepted basic 
human rights documentation and protocol is imperative.  The international community 
has been forced to define such terms as “peace-keepers” and their roles and standard of 
conduct.  At one time, these international representatives were as likely to rape as to 
liberate prisoners of war and refugee camp victims.  Defining their code of conduct and 
setting expectations was pivotal in creating a viable internationally-respected institution.  
Likewise, international norms must be established to protect and emancipate 
marginalized and vulnerable segments of the population, such as women and children, 
through deliberate international codes of conduct and standards, such as CEDAW.  Only 
with these protocols in place, and signatories bound to abide by their goals and principles, 
can a country be held accountable for the status of its people. 
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  While women’s economic and political rights were guaranteed according to the 
1923 Constitution, their social rights were still under the control of men, including 
guardianship, mobility, and divorce.  Human rights and family law are areas of great 
debate in Islamic society.  While most of Egyptian law is civil law, family law for 
Egypt’s Muslim population is based on the Shariah.  Most of the personal status laws 
governing Egypt were codified in Personal Status Law 25 of 1929 and are based on the 
Hanafi school of jurisprudence.  Egypt, using a practice known as talfiq or patching, has 
adopted into its family law some of the Maliki school’s doctrines, which provide more 
flexibility than more traditional interpretations.  During Mubarak’s almost thirty years in 
office, progressive personal status legislation has greatly enhanced the status of Egypt’s 
women in areas where they are most vulnerable.  Some of the main amendments to this 
law came in Law 100 in 1985 on Women’s Alimony Rights and Law 1 in 2000 
containing legislation on marriage and divorce.  Subsequent Laws 10 and 11 in 2004 
created family courts and a fund to assist in collecting alimony and child support.  Finally, 
in Law 4 in 2005 child custody rights were also revised.  These amendments are bringing 
Egyptian family law practice up to current realities and addressing modern-day problems 
facing Egyptian families.  Each law will be addressed in greater detail in the remainder of 
this section. 
 According to Article 20 of Law 100 in 1985, both parents are granted rights of 
access to their children and in cases where there are no parents then the grandparents 
have the same right to access.  In addition, Law 100 granted Egyptian women who are in 
a mut’a (temporary marriage) financial compensation or alimony. Moreover, women 
gained the right to keep the marital home until the end of the child custody.  The main 
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challenge to this law was enforcement.  If the custodian does not comply, then the judge 
will issue a notice.  If the custodian still refuses to comply then the judge can award 
another person temporary custody. 
 In 1986 women were granted equal rights in public space, but the private space 
was still largely a man’s legal domain.   Egyptian women were able at this time to assert 
their legal rights in public space, but at home the situation could be quite different and 
they were legally still second-class citizens.   
Law 1 of 2000 on Personal Status procedural law was passed which included 
progressive legislation on marriage and divorce.  This law amended Law 25 of 1929 and 
sought to adapt to changing realities of modern Egypt.  According to article 17, women in 
unregistered marriages known as urfi were granted the right to file for divorce.  Article 20 
contained the Kuhl’ laws, which gave women the right to file no-fault divorce in 
exchange for forfeiting their financial rights.  The khul’ law greatly improved women’s 
status in private space vis-à-vis men, giving them an option to get out of a bad situation.69  
Article 65 made handing over children or contact with a child or maintenance of a child 
enforceable by law, including possible imprisonment without bail.  Article 67 defined the 
conditions under which a child was to be handed over as a location safe and secure for 
the child.  While these laws were not important for women in happy marriages, they were 
crucial for Egyptian women who were trapped in unhappy or violent marriages. 
Another liberating decision for Egyptian women came in November 2000 through 
the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court Case 243 in which women were granted the 
right to obtain passports and to travel without the permission of a husband or father.   A 
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husband can still seek a court order that prevents his wife travelling either along or with 
their children.  Unmarried women over twenty-one do not need permission to travel. 
  In 2004, Law 10 introduced new family courts aimed at establishing a legal 
system, often including mediation that is non-adversarial, attentive to the interests of the 
family, accessible, and affordable.  Prior to this amendment, a main complaint about the 
new 2000 legislation was the long wait to obtain a divorce or settle custody matters.  
According to 2006 statistics of the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, 80% of the annual cases 
in family courts were concluded and the rate of success in the work of mediation offices 
was 40%.70  Law 11 was also passed in 2004, which provided for a government-run 
family fund to facilitate the implementation of court orders for alimony and child support. 
 In 2005 Law 4 also amended Article 20 of Law 25 from 1929 and granted 
divorced women custody of their children until age fifteen with maintenance or alimony.   
At age fifteen the child has the choice of staying with their custodian parent without 
maintenance until the male reaches the legal age (21) or the female marries.  This law 
granting the mother custody is a significant departure from the traditional Hanafi position 
that had heretofore shaped Egyptian family law.  There are, however, several conditions 
upon the mother’s custodian rights:  She will lose custody if she remarries or is shown to 
be an “unfit” mother.  If the woman is not Muslim, she must raise her children Muslim in 
order to retain custody.   
Women have made decisive gains in Egypt in terms of personal status laws 
governing marriage and divorce, child custody, and alimony.  In addition, these laws 
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show that the Egyptian government will protect the rights of women and prevent them 
and their best interests from being marginalized in Egyptian society. 
IV. Double Standards in Egyptian Society 
Although Egypt’s women have made huge gains in their status within the family, 
nevertheless, a double standard exists between the restrictions, privileges, and burdens 
placed on women and those on men in Egyptian society. Muslim feminists will argue that 
the gender equality prescribed by the Qur’an was undermined by Arabian patriarchy and 
foreign importations.71  Today, women must deconstruct the gender hegemony still 
prevalent in many traditional attitudes and customs in Egypt that affect women.   Some of 
these areas where double standards persist are social norms and not particular pieces of 
legislation.  Three areas where double standards or discriminatory practices exist that do 
not fit neatly into legislation are:  moral conduct, worship opportunities, and dress.  
In Muslim society, for example, clear double-standards exists around questions of 
moral conduct.   Women’s chastity and virginity, for example, are highly important in 
Muslim society.  They are considered essential for women, whereas freedom and even 
licentiousness are looked upon as natural where men are concerned.72  In the case of 
polygamy, according to Islamic law, a man can legally have up to four wives, while a 
woman may have only one husband.  Men are legally sanctioned under polygamy to take 
multiple partners, while women must observe monogamy in order to ensure succession 
and keep inheritance in tact.73  In addition, on the question of adultery, the law punishes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Katherine	  Bullock.	  	  Rethinking	  Muslim	  Women	  and	  the	  Veil	  Changing	  Historical	  &	  
Modern	  Stereotypes.	  	  The	  International	  Institute	  of	  Islamic	  Thought,	  London,	  2003,	  
p.	  XXIII.	  	  
72	  Saadawi,	  The	  Hidden	  Face	  of	  Eve,	  p.	  27.	  
73	  Saadawi,	  The	  Hidden	  Face	  of	  Eve,	  p.	  143.	  
	   50	  
woman for committing adultery more than her male counterparts.  In Egypt a woman can 
get a two-year prison sentence, while a man cannot be punished for adultery if it is 
committed outside of his marital home.  Women are held to a higher moral standard than 
men and punished for behaviors legally sanctioned for men.  
With regard to worship, there is again a double standard.  Men are expected to go 
to Friday prayers, while for women this is not an expectation.  In fact, women are 
discouraged from attending the mosque, which was initially intended to be a public-space 
for democratic discourse.74  Although Islam is not a canonical faith in that there is no 
hierarchical priestly structure as in the Catholic Church, men alone are the imams in 
Islamic mosques.  Women, such as Muslim feminists, Amina Wadud, challenge this 
religious inequality both in word and deed.  In March 2005, Wadud broke all religious 
and social norms when she delivered the Friday khutba at the Claremont Main Road 
Mosque in Capetown, South Africa.  This event was the first of its kind in South Africa. 
Another area of a double standard is in clothing concerns.  A large portion of 
Egyptian men wear modern business suits in public and for business undertakings.  
Muslim women’s wearing of the hijab, however, is a very personal choice made by 
women in Egypt.  Wearing hijab is seen by some Egyptian women as their ticket to 
public space facilitating the role they have to play in society.  By wearing the hijab, they 
can engage in an education and employment without being harassed.   In 1990s Egypt 
wearing the hijab could mean that one was recognizing the law of one’s faith, or seeking 
an acceptable solution to the problem of work and public space constraints.75  Muslim 
feminists, who seek to reinterpret the Qur’an and make it relevant to today’s women, note 
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that the words “veil” and “hijab” do not occur in the Qur’an.  In fact, only the wives of 
the Prophet Muhammad and no other women were required to veil in the Qur’an.76  The 
veil is used traditionally to protect women from the gaze and sexual intentions of men.   
Historically, the veil was used to distinguish which women were under male protection 
and which were fair game or available.77  While there are laws against sexual harassment 
in Western societies (both in the workplace and in public), no such laws have been passed 
and strongly enforced in Muslim states.  Notably, the Labor Codes in Morocco legislated 
against sexual harassment in the workplace.78  Now the degree to which that legislation 
can be implemented is pivotal.  After securing legislation against sexual harassment in 
the U.S., the central government required businesses to train their employees annually to 
recognize sexual harassment in the workplace and proper reporting procedures.  
Moreover, businesses have made managers accountable for reporting incidents of sexual 
harassment in the workplace.  In Muslim culture, the victim must have witnesses 
to bring charges for sexual harassment so the burden of proof falls on the victim.  
Contrary to western perceptions and uninformed stereotypes, veiling, however, 
does not preclude feminism.  In Egypt the new hijab serves various purposes.  First, it is a 
way of asserting one’s devotion to Islam by embracing your Islamic identity in a visible 
way.   The hijab has not been as widely used among the middle and upper class elements 
such that lower middle class elements are wearing the hijab to improve their social status.  
Lower-middle class elements may choose not to wear the hijab to differentiate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Asma	  Barlas,	  “Believing	  Women”	  in	  Islam:	  	  Unreading	  Patriarchal	  Interpretations	  
of	  the	  Qur’an	  (Austin:	  	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  53	  and	  Leila	  Ahmed,	  
Women	  and	  Gender	  in	  Islam	  (New	  Haven	  and	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  
p.	  5.	  
77	  Barlas,	  p.	  56.	  
78	  Barlas,	  p.	  57.	  
	   52	  
themselves from the lower classes, which were wearing hijab in the hopes of appearing 
middle-class.79   In contrast, the men seeking power through religion and its revivification 
are mostly from newly urbanized middle- and lower-middle-class backgrounds, while 
unveiled women are predominantly of the urban upper and middle class.80   Egyptian 
women who veil do not view the veil as the issue it is to Western observers.  Instead, 
Muslim feminists advocate for a refocus on economic and political rights versus the focus 
on dress and its implications. 
V.  Violence against Women in Egypt 
“Violence against women it the most pervasive yet under-recognized human 
rights violation in the world.”81  In 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a Resolution 
on the Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Women (A/RES/58/147).  In 1995, the 
Beijing Platform of Action further delineated violence against women (VAW) into three 
categories:  violence within a family, violence within a community, and state-sponsored 
violence.   Egyptian women are the victims of stoning, honor killings, and increasing 
degrees of domestic violence, even as they are becoming better educated.82   This 
violence thus constitutes an infringement on their social and political progress and is 
worthy of further exploration. 
The most common type of VAW is domestic violence.  “Research has shown that 
a woman is more likely to be assaulted, injured, raped, or killed by a current or former 
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partner than by any other person.”83  One problem with domestic violence in Muslim 
culture is the perception that it is sanctioned by the Qur’an.  Muslim feminists, however, 
have reinterpreted the sura in the Qur’an that has been used to justify wife beating, sura 
4:34, to mean “to go away from” which is the same word as “to beat” in the Arabic 
language.84  A man should go away from his wife if there is the chance of violence, not 
beat his wife.  This principle is also apparent in the sunna and hadith of the Prophet, who 
never beat his wives or servants.  
 In a study of domestic violence rates conducted over nine countries, Egypt fell in 
the middle with about one-third of ever-married women reporting the experience of 
domestic violence.  In a comparative analysis of 1995 and 2005 Egypt there appears to be 
a decrease in the more severe forms of wife beating in parallel with an increase in the 
overall reporting of violence.85   Women have traditionally remained in abusive 
marriages due to unequal divorce laws, non-payment of alimony and child support, and 
precarious custody rights.86 Increased education and upper socio-economic class seem to 
have the most significant effect in reducing the level of domestic abuse.  Likewise, as 
laws improve women’s status vis-à-vis the men in their lives, they have more options if 
their marriages turn violent. 
Marital rape is a second form of violence within a family.   In two 2009 studies of 
sexual abuse of married women conducted in Egypt, 12 percent of women in Lower 
Egypt and 17 percent of women in Cairo reported being forced to engage in sex by their 
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partners.87  Marital rape is not recognized legally or culturally as a crime in the Muslim 
world. 
A third form of family violence is female genital mutilation or FGM.  While some 
Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan under the Taliban, appear more 
conservative than Egypt, they do not practice any form of FGM, either the symbolic 
removal of the clitoris or the full-fledged infibulations.  Egypt has long practiced both of 
these forms of FGM.  The tradition, however, is not an Islamic tradition but a cultural 
practice, dating back to Pharonic times, long before the advent of Islam.88   To this end, 
FGM is practiced equally by Muslim and Christian families in Egypt.  According to 2000 
Demographic and Health statistics, 97 percent of ever-married women in Egypt have 
undergone FGM.89  Muslim feminists disagree about the prevalence of FGM practices.  
While Ahmed claims that cliterodectomies are not common among Egypt’s upper and 
middle classes, Saadawi contends that they are still common even among educated urban 
families with over 50% still considering circumcision as essential to ensuring female 
virginity and chastity.90 91 A 2007 World Health Organization and the Egyptian Ministry 
of Health report shows a decline in the practice of FGM in the younger generation of girls.  
Among girls ages 10 to 18 only 50 percent practice FGM:  43 percent in urban public 
schools, 63 percent in rural schools, and 9 percent in private urban schools have practiced 
FGM.92  While FGM is prevalent among ever-married women, statistics and trends for 
future generations appear promising that this debilitating practice is on the decline, 
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particularly among urban, middle and upper-middle class families.  The causes for FGM, 
however, return to the moral double standard for women as FGM is believed to moderate 
female sexuality and assure a girl of marriageability. 
Honor killings are also common in Upper Egypt, rural areas, and among low-
income urban dwellers.  Between 1998 and 2001 a survey of 125 honor-killing reports 
revealed that 79 percent of the reported crimes were murders of female family members 
suspected of sexual behavior, 9 percent were females due to adultery, 6 percent were 
murders to hide incest, and 6 percent were murders for other reasons. Husbands, fathers, 
or brothers carried out 93% of these murders.93  While 125 deaths over a three-year 
period does not seem drastic compared to some large city crime rates, the fact that they 
are legally-sanctioned murders that go unpunished and that occurred within existing legal 
structures reveals their gendered nature.  
VI.  The Status of Egyptian Women:  Human Development 
Egypt has a longer history of promoting female literacy and education than 
Morocco, with a strong emphasis on literacy as far back as the nineteenth century.  
Nevertheless, up until the mid-twentieth century, much of these literacy campaigns 
focused on the upper and upper-middle class elements of society.  With Arab Socialist 
influence under Nasser, Egypt launched a full campaign to achieve female literacy.  In 
Egypt, the illiteracy rate dropped from about 70 percent to 56 percent for the total 
population between 1960 and 1976 with male illiteracy dropping from 56 percent to 43 
percent and female illiteracy dropping from 84 percent to 71 percent.94  As of 1995, the 
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literacy rate was about 48% of the adult population, according to U.S. State Department 
statistics.95  By 2006 71.4% of the adult population was literate with 83.3% of males and 
59.7% of females literate.  These ratios were improved among the 15-24 year old 
segment of society in which 79% of females and 90% of males are literate.96  
Government sponsored literacy campaigns and improved school enrollment rates are 
improving the options among Egypt’s youth by ensuring them a better education.  In 
addition, the gap between men and women’s literacy levels is slowly being narrowed. 
Literacy Rates in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt 
 Literacy 
over age 15 
total 




Morocco 56% 69% 44% 77% 85% 68% 
Tunisia 78% 86% 71% 97% 98% 96% 
Egypt 66% 75% 58% 85% 88% 82% 
Figure 4 Statistics based on CIA World Factbook 
 
A nation will not advance if its women are backward.  Women as mothers play a 
crucial role in educating their children, and thus perpetuating the civilization.97 In 1952, 
Egypt declared primary, secondary, and tertiary education free; the first two levels were 
made compulsory.98  There is a stereotype today that poor children in the Muslim world 
go to Qur’anic school while upper-class children attend kindergarten.99  While this 
stereotype is, as most stereotypes, an exaggeration of a trend, a disparity does exist in the 
Muslim world that the wealthy go to college and the working class seek God.  Egypt’s 
policy of free education even at the university level seems to undermine this point. Since 
1995 education has been free through the university level and compulsory from ages six 
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through twelve.  Nevertheless, of the 87% who enter elementary school, roughly half 
drop out after their sixth year.100  Further analysis of this high drop out rate is necessary 
to determine if this is a rural-urban trend or has class implications. 
Secondary School Attendance:  Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt 
 2006 2007 2008 
Morocco 52 56 No Data 
Tunisia 87 90 92 
Egypt No Data No Data No Data 
 
 
Tertiary School Attendance:  Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Morocco 12 11 12 13 
Tunisia 32 34 No data No data 
Egypt 29 29 28 No data 
Figure 5 Percentage of Secondary and Tertiary Education Attendees Based on World Bank Statistics 
 
In Egypt, women’s enrollment in higher education rose rapidly and at a much 
faster pace than men’s.  The ratio of men to women, which had been 13.2 to 1 in 1953-
1954, was 1.8 to 1 by 1976.  In 1953-54, 6,121 women attended universities and institutes 
of higher education, and by 1962 this figure had more than tripled to 19, 762.  By 1980 
154,000 women held university degrees, which was one quarter of the university 
graduates in Egypt.101   This data is in keeping with a rise in women’s higher education in 
many countries across the world, universities have shown a rapid increase in the number 
of female graduates compared to the number of male graduates.  In 2010 forty-nine 
percent of university and higher-education students [in Egypt] were women compared to 
the U.S. where 57% of all college students in 2005 were women.  Even in conservative 
Iran the number of women with college educations is surpassing that of Iranian men.102   
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These statistics reveal that the rising number of college-educated women is a part of a 
global trend, which has profound implications for the job market and, with it, promising 
social change. 
Gender mainstreaming in all aspects of society is essential as economic and 
political activity follow human development in a truly egalitarian society.  Today there 
are no laws that discriminate between men and women in terms of education or 
employment, but actual practice is quite different.103  Furthermore, women’s participation 
in economic and public life has precedents in the early Islamic umma, where women 
were actively engaged inside and outside the home in trade, worship, scholarship, and 
war.104  By the 1930s Egyptian women were graduating from Fuad University and 
beginning careers in journalism, law, medicine, and university teaching.105    In 1952 
employment was virtually guaranteed to all Egyptian college graduates.106  Under Nasser, 
Egyptian women’s employment opportunities benefitted from socialism’s message of 
economic gender parity.   The state bureaucracy expanded to accommodate the rising 
number of men and women seeking employment in the public sector.  With the disastrous 
1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt turned from Nasser’s Arab Socialism to more westward 
and liberal leanings under Sadat.   With the move away from socialism, the state found it 
necessary to decrease public sector employment, which led to widespread unemployment.  
In the 1980s came an economic recession and the main employer in Egypt, the public 
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sector, again cut jobs.107  Although matriculation rates rose at this time, employment 
opportunities declined.  These increases in unemployment have gendered implications.  
When there is increased unemployment, women get pushed out of jobs in favor of men. 
High levels of unemployment among men caused resentment between the genders 
as men were passed over for jobs in favor of women.  Employers felt women would work 
for less money with fewer benefits, since their employment was not seen as vital to the 
support of a family.  Men, on the other hand, were legally obligated under Islam to 
provide for their families and thereby required higher salaries with more benefits than 
female counterparts.   This dynamic underwent another shift as dual-income households 
became more prevalent with women seeking employment outside the home to help 
provide for basic family needs.  Notably, labor force participation rates among poor 
Egyptian women are lower than rates among non-poor middle class women, who are 
largely working.  As of 2002 statistics, this phenomenon was apparent in the U.S. too 
with only 7% of households considered traditional, i.e. consisting of a married couple 
with kids with a working father and a mother staying at home; more than twice the 
number of households in the U.S. are dual-income. 108  
The infitah (open door) policy adopted under Sadat and expanded under Mubarak, 
along with an IMF and World Bank monitored structural adjustment program begun in 
1991, liberalized the Egyptian economy and brought Egypt increasingly into the global 
market.   Women have made huge progress, but the highest rungs of power, prestige, and 
influence remain largely a man’s world.  In Egypt, women in the public sector are paid 
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the same as men, however, they do not enjoy the same promotion opportunity, the same 
appointment opportunities to responsible positions, or the training necessary for 
promotion to higher posts.109 Nevertheless, divorce rates are rising among employed 
women in comparison to unemployed housewives living at their husbands’ mercy or 
peasant women, who work free of charge for their families.110  An education and 
employment provides women with something missing from their lives prior to these 
advances:  options. 
VII.  Global Forces:  Urbanization and Middle Class Development  
  With increased educational levels, men and women left the rural sectors in search 
of more promising employment opportunities in urban centers.  High-salaried jobs were 
largely in the cities and thus, major urban areas had consistently had higher education 
levels with lower levels of education documented in the rural areas.  Egypt’s large 
population is centered around urban centers.  Since 1950, Egypt’s population has doubled.   
Most of the population resides in and around Cairo and other metropolitan centers.  
 
Population and Urbanization Statistics 
 Morocco Egypt Tunisia 
1950s Population 13 million 42.3 million NA 
Population Today 32 million 82 million 11 million 
Urbanization % 58% 43% 67% 
Figure 4 Urbanization Statistics on Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia based on CIA World 
Fact Book Statistics  
 
 Nuclear families now face challenges previously unheard of when extended 
family networks predominated.111 Industrialization and the search for salaried 
employment, left nuclear families to fend for themselves as couples moved to urban areas 
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in search of factory jobs.  In the two-income nuclear families, roles are increasingly being 
redefined as they were redefined when extended families turned into nuclear families.  
Divorce rates are much higher in cities and towns than in rural areas.112  The urban 
centers and increased levels of education are providing new possibilities to enterprising 
young Egyptian women. 
The lower classes and lower middle classes did not benefit from Western 
colonization as much as the upper middle classes and elite classes, who collaborated with 
the colonizers, gained access to western education, and made economic inroads into 
Europe.113   The upper class, acted as brokers between European colonizers and 
indigenous Egyptians. They understood tradition but functioned within European circles 
comfortably.  The women who led the way in education were largely from the 
progressive middle class. The Egyptian middle class grew and took in a broader segment 
of society following the institutionalization of Arab socialism in 1956 under Nasser.  
Nasser’s Arab socialism included the nationalization of foreign business interests, all big 
industrial businesses, rent control, minimum wage laws, and the provision of social 
services, which fundamentally altered the class structure.114  The lower- and lower-
middle classes were either negatively or minimally impacted by western economic and 
political occupation.115 
Middle Class Development:  Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt 
 Morocco Egypt Tunisia 
Lower 34% 40% 13.8% 
Middle 53% 40-50% 80% 
Upper 13% Less than 10% 6.2% 
Figure 5 Middle Class Development 
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  In recent years with more Egyptians seeking higher education, both men and 
women are entering professional and white-collar occupations, which is greatly altering 
the Egyptian class structure.116  As the middle class expands, the men and women 
comprising the new-middle class are demanding increased accountability from the 
government.  The democratized mainstream culture embracing Islamic dress and Islamic 
thought is coming from this newly urbanized middle class.  In the past, impetus for 
change came from the dominant upper and middle classes.117   As the middle class has 
expanded, it has increasingly become the voice of the people.    In Egypt, a decrease in 
food subsidies and rising inflation led to disillusionment, especially among the highly 
educated middle and upper class youth, which lead to a return to Islamic roots.  The 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is above all a middle-class missionary institution led by 
doctors, lawyers, and professionals, not by religious scholars.118  It is serendipitous that 
Egypt’s middle class expansion came at a time of increased political pluralism, allowing 
the MB the political domination Egypt is experiencing today. 
VIII.  Women’s Political Representation 
 In 1956 women were granted the right to vote in Egypt and have made gradual 
gains to expand their quantitative and substantive representation since.  Egypt switched 
its political systems from a proportional representation to a majoritarian system, which is 
traditionally not the best system to elect women representatives.  In 2005 Egyptian 
women had 64 reserved seats in parliament.  The governing National Democratic Party 
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was able to win 62 of the 64 seats and seemed to have more backing than other parties.  
In 2009 Egypt passed a law allocating 64 seats in the lower house to women and more 
than 12% of seats in an expanded Parliament following November elections.119  Before 
the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, the law guaranteeing women 64 seats was 
abolished and women secured only ten seats out of 508 in the lower house or less than 
2% of the seats. 
In 1962 Nasser appointed the first Egyptian female cabinet minister, Hikmat Abu 
Zyad, to be Minister of Social Affairs.    Sadat continued the practice of appointing a 
woman as Minister of Social Affairs when he appointed Aishah Rateb to the position.   
Also at this time, Sadat’s wife, Jihan Sadat, took an active role in championing women’s 
causes, a precedent that would be continued by Mubarak’s wife, Suzanne, during her 
husband’s leadership.  In 2010, Egypt boasted three women cabinet ministers:  The 
minister of manpower and immigration, the minister of international cooperation and the 
minister of state for family and population.120  Presidential elections in Egypt are not 
scheduled to take place until May23 and 24, 2012, so it remains to be seen how much of a 
setback the Revolution has been politically for women.  If a president is elected who 
appoints a large number of women to cabinet positions, as occurred in 2007 Morocco, 
then the revolution begun by men and women will not have failed to represent both the 
men and women revolutionaries. 
A key factor in the political representation of women is their ability to turn 
representative change into substantive legislation for women.  A frequent complaint is 
that women once in power get coopted into supporting the status quo instead of 
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representing substantive legislation that promotes women’s interests.  Instead, they 
become a representative sampling of women but with little power to push for progressive 
legislation on their behalf.  In Egypt, President Mubarak’s wife Suzanne’s National 
Council for Women was to a large degree a tool of the establishment.  Nevertheless, it did 
successfully promote gendered legislation for women. 
IX. Conclusion: The Muslim Feminists’ Rebuttal 
Muslim feminists assert that Islam is not the problem with regard to unequal 
human rights, it is the narrow conservative interpretation of Islam by a patriarchal class 
system and exploitation by ruling classes closely aligned with neo-colonialists.  Muslim 
feminists defend Islam as providing all the guidance humankind needs to live a life of 
submission to God, however, men have hijacked the handbook and are manipulating the 
guidelines to serve their own selfish interests.  As Mernissi asserts “if women’s rights are 
a problem for some modern Muslim men, it is neither because of the Qur’an nor the 
Prophet, nor Islamic tradition, but simply because those rights conflict with the interests 
of a male elite.”121  Wadud agrees that interpretations of the textual sources and the 
interpretation’s application when constructing laws governing personal and private affairs 
are based upon male interpreted privilege.122  The popular Western narrative regarding 
Arab women features women who suffer from an inferior social status, voiceless, 
disenfranchised, but as you talk with Muslim women, you find strong, bold women who 
do not want to be saved and if so, only on their own terms.  Muslim feminist 
reinterpretations may be the answer Muslim women need to find their own voice and 
gender parity, but within their faith system.  While Western constructs of  “knowledge,” 
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“objectivity,” and grand transcendent truths, according to Majid, represent in fact neither 
“truth” nor “objectivity” but rather the intellectual traditions, beliefs, and perspectives of 
white middle-class men.123   The prospect of an indigenous path to women’s 
emancipation, one affirming the return to Islam and local customs and practices to right 
the wrongs created by an imperfect society might be the appropriate solution. 124   This 
opinion supports those of Muslim feminists, who argue that the answer is readily 
available from within Muslim society.  Bullock promotes respectability to the believing 
Muslim woman’s voice, to claim liberation and women’s equality within Islam.125 
  The U.S. holds certain truths to be self-evident that the individual is valued over 
the collective and equality is a universal value.    However, Majid argues that “in 
Islam…the idea of atomized individuals exercising their ‘rights’ through participation in 
an electoral ‘democratic’ process has no historical roots in the people’s collective 
memory.”126 Nevertheless, the call for democracy was loud and clear from Tahrir Square.  
Both Egyptian men and women sought these lofty concepts of democracy without 
perhaps a clear view of what democracy might look like in an Islamic society.  Are the 
two concepts of democracy and Islam incompatible and eventually perhaps mutually 
exclusive?  Nevertheless, the U.S. is not the poster-child for gender parity and women’s 
equality as illustrated by its own patriarchal interpretations of sacred texts to maintain 
women in a position subservient to men, who among conservative Americans are 
frequently viewed as the head of the household.  In the popular 1992 movie “My Big Fat 
Greek Wedding,” Toula complains to her mother Maria about her father’s stubbornness 
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and that what he says goes because “the man is the head of the house” to which her 
mother replies, “the man is the head, but the woman is the neck and she can turn the head 
any direction she wants.”  This attitude is prevalent among Islamic feminists.   These 
feminists are satisfied with their station in life because they know that although they have 
less economic and political power, they exert power and influence in their private lives 
and are satisfied with distinct male-female roles.  Muslim and Western feminists, 
however, claim that gender equality should be the foundation, after which the division of 
labor can be defined. 
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Chapter 4:  Threats to Past Progress and Prospects for the Future: 
Morocco’s Challenge to Institutionalize Power & Egypt’s Triple Threat 
  
I. Reframing the Arab Spring – Democracy Wins 
 
 Contrary to popular opinion, the so-called Arab Spring did not begin in Tunisia on 
17 December 2010.   Change in the Middle East began with the Iranian Revolution in 
1979 and the establishment of its Islamic state.  Under the Ayatollah Khomeini, Islamists 
came to power and the progressive laws made under the Shah were reversed.  The 
permissible age for girls to marry was lowered from eighteen to thirteen.  Fathers and 
paternal relatives regained the right to custody of children in the event of divorce or the 
death of the father, boys at two and girls at seven.  Furthermore, husbands regained the 
right to bar their wives from employment.  Men’s right to practice polygamy and to 
divorce at will was fully reinstated.127  This conservative backlash was a reaction to the 
advances made by women under the Shah’s leadership and Western influence.   
In Egypt, the Arab Spring events were the final phase of de-colonization as the 
last layer of European collaborators, the coopted authoritarian regimes, were replaced by 
indigenous, largely Islamic leaderships.  The Arab Spring started in 1979 Iran, when 
popular demonstrations in the streets lead to the overthrow of the western-backed Shah.   
The thaw continued in 1987 as Palestinian youth took to the streets in the first Intifada 
against Israeli occupation.  In 1991 the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party won in the 
first round of multi-party parliamentary elections held in Algeria.  Due to fear over the 
possible establishment of Shariah Law, however, the elections were overturned by the 
Algerian military government with some-say CIA assistance. At this time multi-party 
elections, democracy, and the subsequent rise of political Islam was an unacceptable 
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option to the ruling military elite and Western policy makers.   The spring continued in 
2006 when HAMAS, which is the social safety-net of many Palestinians, providing bread, 
schools, and clinics, won in landslide elections over the establishment PLO candidates.  
In 2009 Iranian elections again goaded the movement along when thousands of 
Iranians took to the streets in support of Incumbent President Ahmadinejad and others in 
support of the main opposition candidate Hossein Moussavi.  Perhaps, this phenomenon 
is part of a global redistribution of power between ruler and ruled of which the U.S.-
based “Occupy Wallstreet” movement is the homegrown variant.  Early December 
demonstrations in Russia challenging President Putin’s rule are the latest example of 
people-powered mass movements challenging autocratic rule.  The people spoke in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen unseating long-reigning autocrats.  They demanded an 
end to corruption, more accountable governments, and democracy.  And democracy is 
indisputably what they received.  Elections in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco were the 
freest elections to date with real opposition parties and unpredictable outcomes.  The rise 
in political Islam that has been a result of these free and fair elections -- of democracy -- 
was in many ways the West’s worst nightmare.  Islamic parties dominated in Egypt and 
were the big winners in Morocco and Tunisia as well. 
Until now, the West had largely dominated the narrative of modern history, 
painting Islam as the oppressor and the West as the liberator of Arab society.128  The 
degree to which these Islamic governments can re-write that narrative will determine the 
fate of their countries.  Perhaps, the new democracies in North Africa mark “a 
progressively defined Islam – one that is democratically available to all…a desirable 
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option for Muslim peoples.“129  Certainly the embrace of Muslim feminists of the canons 
of their own Islamic traditions offers a viable alternative to the theoretical impasse that 
has blocked the emergence of viable non-Western, indigenous alternatives.  
Prior to the post-World War I establishment of nationalist entities throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa, the main loyalty and identity among Muslims was the 
Islamic community, the umma.  While Arab nationalism represents “high politics,” Islam 
represents “low politics” of the Arab masses.130  What is being experienced now in North 
Africa is yet another sign of this politics from below, politics of the masses.   The people 
have granted unprecedented governing power to Islamists from Morocco to Tunisia to 
Egypt.  The people’s voices were heard and their choices made.  Notably, women were a 
large percentage of those voting in each country with unpredictable trends in women’s 
election to parliament, which varied greatly by country.  Tunisia showed the greatest 
increase of women members of parliament (WMPs) with 58 or 27%, Morocco showed a 
strong increase electing 67 WMPs or 17%, and Egypt showing a marked drop in WMPs 
after dropping its gender quota, going from 12% to 2% of WMPs.  The question remains 
whether the politics of the masses can represent, and more importantly protect, all 
elements of society or whether, yet again, Muslim women will fall victim to the vested-
interests of a male-elite system.   
 
II.  Must Women Lose if Democracy Wins – the Political Direction and 
Platform of the Moroccan PJD Leadership 
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 In Morocco the moderate PJD won the most seats in 
parliamentary elections giving it the right to form a government.  
Moroccan women gained greatly from the 2011 Constitutional 
reforms which assured them 60 reserved seat and won an 
additional 7 unreserved seats or 67 seats total in the 2011 
election.  Nevertheless, the cabinet appointments represented a disappointment for 
Moroccan women with only one woman, Bassima el-Hakkawi of the PJD, being elected 
to serve as Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development.  A single 
female cabinet member is a huge step back for Moroccan women; seven women 
ministers were in the cabinet of Benkirane’s predecessor Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi.  
Benkirane assured reporters that “There is no reason to be outraged…there was no 
intention to exclude women from this government.”131   The problem, however, is not an 
oversight by the Benkirane government, it is a lack of pro-active measures to include 
women in the cabinet.  While there has been great progress in the participation of women 
in Moroccan politics, continued affirmative action is required to ensure Morocco’s 
standing as a voice for change in North Africa.  The number of women on national lists 
must be increased as well as the quotas for women at the local level bolstered in order to 
continue to feminize Moroccan political space and facilitate gendered legislation to 
further equalize Moroccan society. 
Furthermore, the western conviction of the preeminence of democracy as a governing 
system is being challenged by its fear of Islam as a religious doctrine.  In Egypt, the 
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Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) strong showing in 2005 parliamentary elections (87 of 454 
seats), Hamas’s 2006 victory in Palestinian elections (76 of the 132 seats), and Hezbollah 
and its Shi’ite ally Amal’s gains (35 seats out of 128) in Lebanon’s 2011 elections, are 
by-products of free and fair elections.  These events even predated the recent gains made 
by Islamic parties in parliamentary elections in Tunisia on October 23 with the moderate 
Al-Nahda receiving 40% of the seats (89 of 217), in Morocco on November 25 with the 
PJD receiving 26% of the seats (107 of 395), and in Egypt’s November-January 3-phase 
elections with the MB’s FJP receiving 58% of the seats (294 of 508) and the 
ultraconservative Salafi Nour Party receiving another 24% of the seats (121 of 508), 
Islamic parties are increasingly dominating at the polls.  What remains to be seen is if the 
western principle of government by the people can withstand the polarizing, male-elite 
Islam has shown in the past.  That is to say, can the revolution begun by men and women 
in these societies move forward to represent all elements of these societies. 
 In Morocco the king still wields the majority of the power but he is slowly and 
deliberately yielding power to democratically elected institutions.  He is allowing a 
revolution from within the existing political structures to transform Morocco.  In 
Morocco, the electoral system is based on proportional representation (PR).  It has been 
carefully manipulated to ensure that no party can win the majority of parliamentary seats.  
Therefore, the opposition Islamist PJD has not been able to gather a majority, but has 
shown real gains in recent years:  9 seats in 1997, 42 seats in 2002, 46 seats in 2007, and 
107 seats in 2011.  The governing Istiqlal Party (IP) came in second place with 60 seats 
and along with the People’s Movement was incorporated into a governing coalition with 
the PJD.   
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In addition, in 2011 the King Mohammed did allow the winning party to fill the prime 
minister’s position, which is a major step forward in the king’s relinquishing additional 
control to elected institutions.   In the 2002 election, Mohammed VI exerted his own 
authority by selecting a prime minister who was not from the victorious party, instead 
choosing a nonpartisan technocrat, Driss Jettou, to head a coalition government.   Prior to 
the 2007 elections, however, the king announced that he would name a prime minister 
based on the voters’ preferences, further solidifying the importance of the people’s 
voice.132   True to his word, the king appointed to the premiership Abbas el Fassi, who is 
the leader of the Istiqlal party, which won 52 of the 325 parliamentary seats.  With the 
July 2011 constitutional reforms, Mohammed VI institutionalized his obligation to select 
the leader of the winning party in parliament to be prime minister.  Following the win by 
the Islamist PJD party, King Mohammed met with the PJD’s General Secretary, Abdellah 
Benkirane, and named him head of the government.  This commitment to institutional 
change and rule of law further solidified Mohammed VI’s legacy as a reformist in 
Moroccan society.  Mohammed VI’s simultaneous commitment to rule of law, 
democracy, and women’s empowerment bode well for the future of all Moroccans. The 
only question remaining is to what degree the elected parliament can stay the course in 
women’s empowerment and legislative reforms. 
III. Egypt’s Triple Threat to Women:  Military, Reactionary, and 
Islamic 
Islamic Dominance: FJP and Nour’s Future 
 
Today women’s progressive agenda in Egypt faces a triple threat from the 
entrenched military leadership, a reactionary backlash to progress made under Mubarak, 
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and an Islamic resurgence.  In popular demonstrations, Egyptian students, workers, and 
intellectuals occupied Egypt’s Tahrir Square and toppled the long-reigning Mubarak 
regime in favor of democracy, greater freedom, and an end to corruption.  Following the 
2011 Egyptian revolution, the parliamentary quota for women passed into law in 2009 
was abruptly cancelled.  The gradual gains made by women are, in 2012, in jeopardy of 
being rescinded.  Notably, this initial threat to women’s advancement did not come at the 
hands of the Islamists, but from the entrenched military leadership that assumed the post-
Mubarak power vacuum.   
Egyptian women first face a military threat.  The 1952 military coup, which 
brought the Free Officers to power ushered in three generations of military leaders in 
Egypt. The Egyptian military is not a highly integrated institution.  Instead, it remains a 
male-dominated system.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), composed 
of senior military officers and headed by Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi, came to 
power immediately after Mubarak relinquished the presidency on February 11, 2011.  In 
March, the Egyptian Women’s Union demanded a minimum of 35 percent female 
representation in all committees formed to change the constitution, as a secular 
constitution, a secular family code, and total equality before the law.133  And yet, Egypt’s 
democratic future and the status of women is threatened by the SCAF, which appeared 
disgruntled with the role women played in bringing down the government and threatening 
the perks they enjoyed under Mubarak. Women were highly active in the revolution, but 
in the post-revolution reconstruction have been excluded and marginalized.   
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The military’s abuse of power and alienation of women is nothing new.  Under 
past presidents, the military, coupled with the security forces and civilian businessmen, 
expanded their own wealth at the expense of the Egyptian masses.  The military 
expanded its hold over the economy, controlling 5-20 percent of the Egyptian economy 
by 2000.  More recently, the SCAF manipulated the composition of the committee 
charged with drafting the new constitution to ensure they nominated 4/5 of the members 
who can maintain their vested interests.  When Egyptian legal experts wrote a new basic 
document, calling for a strong parliament and limited presidency, the SCAF felt it too 
liberal and threw it out.  Instead, they wrote an interim constitution that placed greater 
power in the presidency, which preemptively increased the military’s position as all the 
presidents since 1952 have been military officers, bolstered by and bolstering the military.  
Notably, women were not included in any of the decisions being made which will 
determine the direction of Egypt’s future government.  Today the power rests in the 
president, who appoints the prime minister, but Egyptians are demanding a parliamentary 
system, in which a freely-elected majority selects the prime minister.134  The army is 
unlikely to yield the power, prestige, and perks it has amassed since coming to power in 
1952 and to which Egypt’s women are not privy.  The army has usurped the Egyptian 
revolution. 
More recently, in November 2011, protesters again took to the streets, accusing 
the generals of delaying the transfer of power to a civilian government.  In December, the 
protests took a more gendered tone.  For five days, women protested en masse the abuses 
of the military regime.  Egyptian women insisted they would not be marginalized as in 
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the past.  The military’s response was swift, decisive, and violent.  The military was 
videoed stripping a female protester and beating her, which raised condemnation both 
inside and outside Egypt.  Perhaps as the Prophet Mohammed’s wife Umm Salama was 
able to correct the initial omission of women from God’s teachings by pointing out this 
omission to the Prophet Muhammad and a wrong was righted, so too women will again 
be instruments of their own empowerment, altering the current course the revolution is 
taking.  Salama’s criticism became the means by which God corrected the direction of the 
entire Islamic Umma.  Perhaps the voices of female protesters will serve to correct the 
current path of the Egyptian military leaders.  
The second threat facing women’s advancements under Mubarak is a reactionary 
backlash to the gendered legislation passed under his leadership.  The nationalist 
governments that were recently toppled were historically supported by colonial powers.  
Mubarak maintained close ties to the West and was viewed by many Egyptians as a U.S. 
puppet, catering to Western views and economic interests.  In a sense, the secular Arab 
nationalist leaders became surrogate colonialists.135   Moreover, these pro-Western, 
secular governments throughout the Muslim world were supported by the West, even 
when they repressed their populace.136  Therefore, they were increasingly alienated from 
their own people.  The progressive legislation promoted by women and championed by 
former First Lady Suzanne Mubarak are thus seen as illegitimate and meeting a 
reactionary backlash of anti-government resentment.  These laws include:  the law 
increasing the age mothers have custody of their children from nine to fifteen years, the 
law on visiting rights for divorced parents, and the kuhl’ divorce law, which allows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Majid,	  p.	  55.	  	  
136	  Bullock, p. XXXIV.	  
	   76	  
women to divorce without their husband’s approval.  While these laws improved the 
status of women immensely, they are now being called into question because of Suzanne 
Mubarak’s influence in getting them passed.  The valuable and substantive progress made 
by women under Mubarak’s regime is at risk due to its association with a now discredited 
leader. 
The third threat to Egyptian women comes from the domination of Egyptian Islamic 
parties in recent parliamentary elections.  Indeed, the moderate MB’s FJP took 58% of 
the vote, while the Nour Party, an ultra-conservative fundamentalist Salafi organization, 
won 25% of the votes for parliament’s lower house.  If more conservative political 
agendas are advanced by their candidates, now parliamentarians, these Islamic parties 
may pose a very real threat to the progress of Egyptian women.  These lower house 
elections were completed in three stages and the upper house will be elected in three 
similar stages.   More immediately, women felt their first setback in the first round of 
voting, when women won no parliamentary seats.  As previously mentioned, the 2009 
parliamentary women’s quota, which had previously guaranteed female representatives in 
parliament, was rescinded.  After three rounds of voting, only eight seats out of 508, or 
2%, were won by Egypt’s women.  Significantly 62% of eligible voters, a large portion of 
whom were women, turned out at the polls, so these results do represent the majority of 
voting Egyptians.  Notably, Egypt did not have election observers monitor the voting; 
instead, it had judges. 137  Judges and the judiciary playing such a pivotal oversight role in 
the elections foreshadows the increasing role the judiciary and shariah law may play in 
Egyptian legislative affairs. 
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The question remains whether the shift towards democracy and increased freedom in 
Egypt will mean a net gain or a loss in the status of Egyptian women.  Recent elections 
may be a harbinger of the retreat to second-class citizenship for Egypt’s female 
population if concern over the rise in Islamic electoral success proves true.   The 
moderate FJP and ultraconservative Nour Party dominated the first post-Mubarak 
parliamentary elections, gaining more than 75% of the parliamentary seats.   Nevertheless, 
the promised economic redistribution may mean political and social setbacks for Egypt’s 
women.  Mubarak’s ominous warning of the political future of Egypt being a choice 
between him and the Islamists appears true, but the Islamists assert they can turn electoral 
success into practical improvements in the lives of Egyptians, both male and female. 
II. Islamic Parliamentary Gains During Arab Spring 
 
IV.  Assessing the Islamic Movement’s Histories and Future Direction 
An increasing presence of Islamic parties in parliament does not necessarily pose a 
threat to Egyptian women.  The agenda these parties pursue, their platform, is key.  
Therefore, this paper will next assess the historic roots of these Islamic parties, the MB’s 
FJP, Nour, and the PJD to evaluate their position on women in society. 
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The MB was founded by Hasan al-Banna in the 1920s.  The organization grew 
rapidly in the 1930s, especially among the educated lower, middle class.   Al-Banna was 
assassinated in retaliation for the MB’s assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister al-
Na’rashi.  Like Hamas, the MB has a long history of charitable and social work, 
especially among the lower classes.  The MB impressed the urban lower-middle and 
working class and the rural working class due to its activism in establishing schools, 
hospitals, and cottage industries.138  In addition, the MB gained supporters as it rejected 
Western influence and the coopted elite’s exercise of excessive power and privilege. In 
1984 the MB began presenting some candidates running as independents since the MB 
was outlawed.  In 2005 MB candidates, still running as independents, won 20% of the 
lower house.   What remains to be seen is if the MB can run a country as effectively as it 
has acted as an opposition element to the Mubarak and previous regimes.  In addition, the 
MB has been staunch supporters of a conservative social agenda for women, including 
polygamy, female genitalia mutilation, and child custody favoring the father.  Yet women 
rank among the MB’s membership and helped achieve its landslide victory in recent 
parliamentary elections.  The unanswered question is whether democracy will moderate 
the MB’s political platform in order to gain a constituency or democracy will signal a 
conservative social agenda in Egypt. 
   Perhaps even more startling has been the success of the Salafi al-Nour party in 
Egypt, which won 24% of parliamentary seats.   Two voices of Egyptian feminism exist:  
a dominant western, secular, upper middle class voice and an alternate native, vernacular, 
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and Islamic voice.139  The Salafis currently represent this alternate voice.  Salafis are 
literalists, who are strongly influenced by Saudi clerics.  With Mubarak’s ouster, political 
space has opened in Egypt for the Salafis, who had refused to participate in politics under 
an un-Islamic regime, but are now engaged.  Perhaps most troubling, the concept of 
democracy and majority rule contradicts the founding principles of the Nour Party.  
Democracy dictates that the will of the people takes precedence over the will of God, 
whereas the Salafis assert that democracy is acceptable as long as it does not contradict 
Islamic sharia.140  Whether the Nour Party can reconcile these dichotomies and work 
within a democratic system to gain support remains a question to be answered in the 
coming months. 
The next step must be a closer examination of the different leanings and 
proclivities of the FJP and the Nour Party.  The FJP has endorsed commitments to protect 
individual rights and will institute the Islamic zakat or income tax (2.5%) to be regulated 
by Islamic charities.  These charities would be encouraged to set up their own religious 
schools and hospitals.  The FJP would encourage women to accept traditional gender 
roles, not through legislation, but through community centers for matchmaking and 
marriage counseling.  The 2011 MB platform omitted two controversial clauses from the 
2007 MB platform.  The first was the creation of a clerical committee to review 
legislation for compliance with Islamic Law and to advise parliament and the president of 
any inconsistencies.  The second was the prohibition against women and non-Muslims 
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running for president.141    The Nour Party is more interested in seeking legislative 
change.  The Nour Party proposes to regulate the content of the arts and entertainment, 
women’s work and dress, and the religious content of public education, all of which the 
FJP has not advocated.  In addition, the Nour Party supports the idea of a specialized 
council of religious scholars providing parliamentary oversight of legislation to ensure 
compliance with Islamic Law, which the FJP dropped from its platform.142  The FJP has 
claimed that it will not form a coalition with the Nour Party.  The Nour Party’s agenda, 
according to its secretary Abdel Gharfour, includes restoring public order, creating 
democratic institutions, forming a powerful and popular cabinet, and promoting 
economic development.  
Muslim feminists have expressed fear over the possibility that an Islamic 
government might reverse personal status laws that favor women, specifically the 2000 
khul’ law granting women the right to divorce.  Gharfour denies that abolishing the khul’ 
law is even a part of the Nour Party’s agenda. 143  Stated goals of the Salafis include: the 
establishment of an Islamic state and inciting violence against Copts.  Unlike the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Nour Party would not condone the ascendancy of women or Copts to 
the presidency, although this was not a part of the final Nour Party platform.144  
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Nevertheless, the Nour Party’s previous and current agendas are cause for alarm as they 
seek to impose shariah law, whose seventh century interpretation of the women’s position 
in society would be a major retreat from social and political gains women have enjoyed 
under less traditional, more moderate regimes. 
In Egypt, a decrease in food subsidies and rising inflation lead to disillusionment, 
especially among the highly educated middle and upper class youth, leading to increased 
Islamization.  A 1982 survey of Egypt’s veiled women assessed their attitudes towards 
various political issues. There was overwhelming consensus in favor of education, the 
right to employment, professional advancement, being open to women, and for equal 
political rights.  The only issue that was not supported by more than half the women was 
the matter of equality in marital relations.145   These are the advances of which Muslim 
feminists are the most proud because they impact women’s daily lives.  These are the 
advances at greatest risk if the political milieu switches to a more conservative 
interpretation of Islamic practices. 
V. Conclusion 
Women have made substantial gains in both Morocco and Egypt in terms of  
their rights within the family, human development, and political representation.  The U.S. 
has stood by its founding principles and stepped back as democratic voices first toppled a 
long-time U.S. ally in Egypt and then ushered in an Islamic-party dominated parliament.  
Nevertheless, concern inside Egypt and from Western observers persists.  The fate of 
Egyptian women’s social and political gains is in a precarious position:  First, the military 
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refuses to relinquish its sixty-year hold on power and prestige.  Next, reactionary forces 
seek to dismantle the Mubarak legacy of women’s legal advancement within the family 
and with it the personal empowerment gained with the advocacy of former- First Lady 
Suzanne Mubarak. Finally, the MB’s FJP and the Salafi Nour Party will lend their 
divergent Islamic perspectives to the future course of women’s empowerment in Egypt.   
The FJP’s next test will be whether or not Islamic elements can function as well within 
state structures as they have maneuvered on the fringe and if the promised end to 
corruption, improvement of the economy, and social reforms will represent a significant 
loss in power to Egypt’s women.  The Nour Party will have to work within the 
democratic system, which it earlier spurned, and will perhaps have to moderate its 
positions somewhat to keep its constituency. 
 Morocco as well is experiencing a wave of democracy, but with tighter central 
control and direction still proceeding from King Mohamed VI.  Likewise, the potential 
for the Islamic PJD to gain a parliamentary majority is eliminated by electoral Gerry-
rigging, while democracy and the Moroccan voice at the polls is ushering in an 
unprecedented time of Islamic influence.  The PJD won the most parliamentary seats and 
was thus constitutionally-mandated to name the prime minster and form a coalition 
government.  The challenge for the PJD is how to deliberately incorporate women into 
the Moroccan political sphere, which on the outset, it seems prepared to accomplish with 
women’s parliamentary representation increasing significantly in the same election that 
brought the PJD to power.     
 Muslim feminists have found a political voice within Islam as they have helped to 
usher in a time of unprecedented democratically-elected Islamic Party influence.  Now 
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Muslim feminists must continue to reinterpret an Islam whose egalitarian message they 
were unable to fully enjoy since the seventh-century male-elite’s reinterpretation of Islam 
marginalized their role in the public sector and the rights and parity they could enjoy in 
the private.   Women have achieved amazing progress in reasserting their rights to the 
level of equality that was given them with the advent of Islam.  They must continue to 
demand that the new male elite speaks with an inclusive voice to represent all citizens 
instead of catering to their own interests as in the past. 
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